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Since 1996, South African (SA) apple producers have faced major stntctural changes
following the deregulation ofSA apple marketing and the declining profitability ofapple exports as
world prices have fallen in real terms. Global retail consolidation has also shifted market power in
fresh fntit value chains towards downstream firms (retailers, category managers, and import
receivers), and put pressure on upstream (exporter, packer and producer) margins. Retailers have
become more demanding about which apple cultivars they will stock, and more sensitive about non-
product terms of sale, such as fntit handling methods, social and ethical issues and consumer
sensitivities. With competition from other apple exporting countries (such as France and Chile)
likely to increase, players in the SA fresh apple export value chain must implement appropriate
strategies to try and improve its competitiveness.
This study investigates aspects of cooperation between SA apple producers, packers and
exporters in the Western Cape and LangkloofEast areas during 2001, in order to show where these
players need to commit more resources to make the SA fresh apple export value chain more
competitive. Fresh apple exports are the focus of the study as about 58 per cent ofannual gross
income on SA apple farms is derived from export sales. A recursive Ordinary Least Squares model
shows that higher levels of tntst led to more cooperation (joint problem-solving and
communication) between these players. Higher levels ofjoint problem-solving and communication,
in turn, encouraged producers to commit more human resources to working with packers and
exporters to find ways ofmaking the chain more competitive. Results also suggest that the players
need to particularly improve cooperation in production planning, delivery scheduling and quality
contro!' Packers and exporters ranked climatic conditions as the top constraint currently facing the
SA fresh apple industry, probably reflecting their concerns over the annual "pack-out" (quality
distribution) of the apple crop. Other factors affecting competitiveness include the recent
withdrawal ofgovernment export incentives, restrictive labour policy, high real interest rates, a
lack ofmarket information, and the growing and marketing ofinappropriate apple cultivars.
Key industry players suggest that SA fresh apple producers need to consider whether or not
to invest in new apple cultivars, like the Pink Lady, in order to meet the changing demands of
international fresh apple consumers. This study, therefore, also compares the relative potential
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profitability of investing in orchards to produce the Pink Lady and the Golden Delicious - a
traditional SA fresh apple export cultivar. Given uncertainty about the yields, costs and prices, and
that apple orchard investment costs are irreversible (cannot be ./idly recovered in the short tenn) ,
an ex ante version of the Dixit-Pindyck investment model is used to assess the viability of these
investment alternatives under uncertainty and irreversibility. This model accounts for uncertainty
and irreversibility by raising the orthodox hurdle rate that must be met to justifY the orchard
investment by an amount that reflects the value ofthe option to postpone the investment.
Typical Pink Lady apple orchards in the Western Cape and Langkloof East areas have
higher orchard establishment, crop harvesting and crop spraying costs than do Golden Delicious
apple orchards, but retailers will currently pay R493 per ton (25.3 per cent) more, on average, for
Class I apples ofthe Pink Lady brand. Results show that a potential Pink Lady orchard investment
is relatively more profitable than a potential Golden Delicious orchard investment. In addition, SA
apple producers taking into account uncertainty and irreversibility should only invest in a 35-year
Pink Lady or Golden Delicious apple orchard if the expected annual real rate-of-return is above
11.41 per cent or 9.45 per cent, respectively. These modified hurdle rates are about two times the
orthodox real rate of five per cent that is commonly used in capital budgeting analyses. Such
differences between orthodox and modified hurdle rates have also been reported in recent studies
on the adoption ofdairy technology and grapefruit orchard investments in the United States.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank all, and especially the following persons and organizations, who
made this study possible:
Professor Gerald Ortmann, Professor and Head, School of Agricultural Sciences and
Agribusiness, University of Natal, for his co-supervision, encouragement, speedy return of
draft copies and attention to detail.
Mr Mark Darroch, Senior Lecturer, School of Agricultural Sciences and Agribusiness,
University of Natal, for his co-supervision, enthusiastic involvement in the research, and
drive to help make the dissertation better.
The Deciduous Fruit Producers' Trust (DFPT), and Mr Anton Rabe, ChiefExecutive Officer
of the DFPT, for insightful recommendations, general apple industry information, and
administrative help in distributing study questionnaires.
The academic staff, Mrs Marsha Manjoo, and my colleagues in the Discipline of
Agricultural Economics, University of Natal, for their appreciated research suggestions,
support, and friendship throughout the duration of my studies.
The apple producers, packers and exporters who participated in the study.
My siblings, Kim, Anthony, Lara and Bart, for their "open door" policy, support and
ongoing interest.
My parents, Neville and Rose, for their unfailing love and encouragement throughout my
life. Thank-you.
Naomi, my "wife-to-be", for your understanding, enthusiasm in all things, friendship and
growing love. I love you too.









TABLE OF CONTENTS vu
lliTm TABlliS ~
LIST OF FIGURES Xl
rnITODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1: KEY CHALLENGES FACrnG THE SOUTH AFRICAN FRESH APPLE
EXPORT VALUE CRAm 6
1.1 Intensifying Global Competition 6
1.2 The SA Apple Industry in a Global Context 8
1.3 Profile of the SA Fresh Apple Industry 9
CHAPTER 2: COOPERATION IN, AND COMPETITIVENESS OF, THE SOUTH AFRICAN
FRESH APPLE EXPORT VALUE CRAm 12
2.1 Key Value Chain Principles 12
2.1.1 Cooperation and Trust 13
2.1.2 Cooperative Behaviour, Commitment and Competitiveness 15
2.1.3 A Conceptual Model of Trust, Cooperation and Human Resource
Commitment 16
2.1.4 Applying the Conceptual Model to the Case ofthe SA Fresh Apple Export
Value Chain 17
2.2 Data Sources and Research Methodology 19
CHAPTER 3: COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FRESH APPLE VALUE CRAm:
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 26
3.1 Index Scores for the Perceived Levels of Trust, Joint Problem-solving,
Communication and Human Resource Commitment 26
3.2 Recursive Models of the Trust - Cooperation - Commitment Link 27
Vlll
3.3 Overall Cooperation and the Perceived Constraints on the Competitiveness of
the SA Fresh Apple Value Chain 29
3.4 Discussion 31
CHAPTER 4: EVALUATING POTENTIAL APPLE ORCHARD INVESTl\t1ENTS IN SOUTH
AFRICA UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND IRREVERSIBILITY 34
4.1 Expected Changes in Income and Costs When a New Cultivar is Adopted 34
4.2 Modifying Orthodox Capital Budgeting Methods to Account for the Option to
Postpone an Investment 36
4.2.1 The Option to Postpone an Investment 37
4.3 Data Sources and Research Methodology 40
CHAPTER 5: APPLE ORCHARD INVESTl\t1ENTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND
IRREVERSIBILITY: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 45
5.1 Expected Apple Pack-outs, Prices and Annual Net Returns 45
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis ofExpected Investment Present Values 47









Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics and cases of enterprise diversification by fresh apple
producers, packers and exporters in the SA apple export value chain, 1998-
2000. 20
Table 2.2. Questions used to capture SA apple producer perceptions about the levels
of trust, cooperation and commitment between players in the SA apple
export value chain. 22
Table 2.3. Questions used to capture SA fresh apple producers' perceptions about the
level of cooperation with packers in key SA apple export value chain
activities. 23
Table 2.4. List of potential constraints that limit the competitiveness of the SA apple
export value chain. 24
Table 3.1. Producer scores for their perceived levels of trust, joint problem-solving,
communication and human resource commitment in working relationships
with packers and exporters in the SA fresh apple export value chain. 27
Table 3.2. Respondents' scores for their perceived levels of cooperation with other
players in key SA fresh apple export value chain activities. 29
Table 3.3. Respondents' rankings of the key constraints on SA fresh apple export
value chain competitiveness. 30
Table 5.1. Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apple quality distribution and average
real prices (2000=100), Western Cape and Langkloof East regions of South
Africa, 1999-2001. 45
Table 5.2. Estimated real income and costs per hectare for Golden Delicious and Pink
Lady apples in South Africa for years 0, 10 and 35 after orchard
establishment (2000=100). 48
Table 5.3. Plausible lower, most likely and upper PV parameters for Golden Delicious
and Pink Lady apple orchard investments using a real discount rate (p) of
3, 5 and 7 per cent. 50
x
Table 5.4 Estimated modified real hurdle rates and optimal investment triggers per
hectare for Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apple orchard investments in




FIGURE 1.1 Real world fresh apple prices (2000 = 100) and SA fresh apple export
volumes, 1994 -1999. Source: CIAMD (2001). 7
FIGURE 4.1 The optimal timing of an investment occurs when the value of waiting
to invest (curve WIW2) is equal to the value of investing immediately
(curve hh) (Source: Purvis et al., 1995). 38
FIGURE 5.1 Distribution of the present value of expected annual net returns per
hectare generated by Monte Carlo simulation for a Pink Lady apple




The resource-based view of the firm proposes that a firm must develop appropriate resources
and capabilities that are valuable, rare and are difficult to substitute or copy in order to create a
sustainable competitive advantage (O'Keeffe, 1998a; Thompson and Strickland, 1998). This focus
on the firm as the main unit of analysis overlooks the potential competitive advantages or
disadvantages that are created by the linkages that a firm has with other players in a value chain. For
any industry, the value chain encompasses all activities associated with the flow and transformation
of goods from the raw materials stage, through to the end-user, as well as the associated information
flows (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). The relational view of competitive advantage focuses on these
linkages, and contends that collaborating firms can use relation-specific assets (such as specialized
capital investments, information, language and know-how), knowledge-sharing, complementary
resource endowments (such as collective reputation and excellent customer and supplier
relationships), and effective governance, to strengthen the competitive edge created by
differentiation and/or low-cost competitive strategies (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Managers, therefore,
need to consider how to cooperate across firms to build alliances and leverage resources that make
their value chains more competitive.
Cooperation describes a process by which firms develop mechanisms to come together,
interact and form relationships for mutual benefit (Anderson and Narus, 1990). These mechanisms
may be informal or formal, and are likely to change over time, depending on the willingness of the
firms to continue in cooperative relationships (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Smith et al., 1995).
Higher levels of cooperation are expected to: help improve the rate of learning and innovation;
lower transaction costs (Dyer, 1997; Lazzarini et a!., 2001); and achieve effective coordination,
leading to better human and product performance (Hewett and Bearden, 2001; Smith et al., 1995).
The first aim of this study is to consider how players in the South African (SA) fresh apple
export value chain can improve cooperation in order to address constraints that prevent the chain
from being more competitive internationally. Since 1996, SA fresh apple producers have faced
major structural changes following the deregulation of SA apple marketing. In addition the
profitability of apple exports fell from 1995 to 1999 as world prices fell in real terms (O'Rourke,
2001). Real world fresh apple prices rose in 2000 but declined again in 2001 (The Directorate:
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Agricultural Statistics, 2002). Despite a recovery in the net export realization price of SA fresh
apple exports (helped by a weaker Rand against the British Pound, US Dollar and Euro) and higher
local prices (Nelsen, 2002), the profitability of many SA fresh apple producers has fallen due to
prolonged drought, global retail consolidation, and increased supply from rival exporters. Global
retail consolidation has shifted market power in fresh fruit value chains towards downstream firms
(retailers, category managers, and import receivers), and put pressure on upstream (exporter, packer
and producer) margins (Cook, 1998; O'Rourke, 2001). About 10 per cent of SA fresh apple
producers faced liquidation of their business operations in 2000 (Oall, 2001). With competition
from other apple exporting countries likely to increase, players in the SA fresh apple export value
chain must implement appropriate strategies to try and improve its competitiveness. This
dissertation describes the challenge to become more internationally competitive, and in Chapter 1,
discusses how the SA fresh apple export value chain has performed in global markets since 1996. It
then considers how players in the SA fresh apple export value chain - producer, packers and
exporters - can make the chain more competitive internationally. Fresh apple exports are the focus
of this study since about 58 per cent of annual gross income on SA apple farms is derived from
export sales in a typical season (Directorate: Agricultural Statistics, 2001).
A conceptual model of cooperative behaviour amongst the players in a value chain is
outlined in Chapter 2 as a basis for developing research hypotheses and applying these to the case of
the SA fresh apple export value chain. This model draws on work by Anderson and Weitz (1991),
Campbell (1992), Hunt et al. (2002), and Smith et al. (1995), to highlight the role of trust in
promoting cooperative behaviour - like joint problem-solving and communication - and how such
behaviour encourages the players to commit more human resources to chain activities. The model is
then extended to consider how monitoring changes internal and external to the value chain, and
evaluating the risks associated with chain specific investments, can help to build trust and
implement cooperation by identifying the key constraints on competitiveness that the players need
to manage over time. This study analyses these issues by using the first empirical survey of the
perceptions of apple producers, packers and exporters in the major SA apple producing areas of the
Western Cape and Langkloof East conducted in 2001. Chapter 2 describes the data sources and
research methodology, while Chapter 3 reports and discusses the research results, including the
most important factors that the players perceive constrain the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple
export value chain.
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Interviews with key industry players (Dall, 2001; Finn, 2001; Jensen, 2001; Rabe 2001) at
all levels in the SA fresh apple export value chain during March 2001 showed that the failure by SA
apple producers to adopt more widely new apple cultivars to meet changing consumer tastes was a
serious threat to their competitiveness. Ongoing consolidation and the increasing price-making
influence of multi-national retail grocery stores has allowed retailers to become increasingly more
aggressive about which apple cultivars they will stock (O'Rourke, 2001). The World Apple Report,
which rates retailer perceptions about current apple cultivar preferences, and the extent to which
they plan to hold more of each cultivar in the next season, identifies Gala, Red Delicious, Braeburn,
Fuji and Pink Lady as the five most popular cultivars for the future (World Apple Report, 2001 a).
The Pink Ladyl cultivar was perceived by retailers to be the most popular of the new apple cultivars
currently exported from SA, and on average most of the surveyed retailers planned to stock more
Pink Lady apples in the future. Granny Smith and Golden Delicious apples - which together
constitute about 68 per cent of total SA apple exports - were ranked in sixth and tenth position,
respectively. Clearly, the current basket of apples grown in SA seems out of line with future
consumer trends, and threatens the international competitiveness of the SA apple industry.
To counteract this threat, it has been suggested that a systematic approach of introducing
emerging cultivars into the current SA apple basket is probably required by replanting apple
orchards at the end of their lifespan with these cultivars rather than with the original cultivars (Dall,
2001; Rabe, 2001). This strategy aims to create sustainable competitive advantage by supplying
retailers with apples having better taste, shape, size and colour so that they successfully compete for
the foreign consumer's DollarlEurolPound despite the wider availability of traditional and exotic
fruits. This means that SA apple producers must consider planting or replanting orchards with apple
cultivars that match expected future consumer needs. Determining which apple cultivar investment
opportunity is the best alternative given limited capital resources, and deciding when to invest, are
critical components of the investment decision, particularly given uncertainty about the future
income, costs and performance of the new apple orchard investment. A "wrong" or a regrettable
choice is usually costly, since most investment expenditures - including apple orchards - are
partially or completely irreversible (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995). Irreversibility means that the start-up
1 Pink Lady is the trade mark name used for the Cripps-pink apple cultivar.
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investment costs are sunk costs once the investment expenditure occurs, and cannot be fully
recovered in the short-term.
The expected Net Present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate-of-Return (IRR) approaches to
capital budgeting are commonly used to assess the desirability of an investment opportunity. These
methods involve (1) estimating the expected net cash flows for each period of the investment's
productive life, and then (2) discounting these cash flows at a discount rate that reflects the
weighted average cost of capital required to finance the project. Although the orthodox decision
rules are to accept the investment with the greatest positive NPV and IRR, Collins and Hanf (1998)
suggest that these NPV and IRR estimates have significant bias because they ignore the possibility
that investment expenditure can be delayed. Typically, NPV evaluations assume that investors face
a dichotomous "now" or "never" decision with no possibility to postpone the investment until a
later time when more information might be available. In most cases, however, investment
expenditure can be delayed, and the possibility to benefit from "hindsight" can profoundly affect if
and when a manager might make the investment, especially when expected net returns from the
investment are uncertain (Purvis et a!., 1995; Dixit and Pindyck, 1995). Thus, given uncertainty and
irreversibility, an option to postpone a capital investment has value. Investing now would mean that
managers would give up the opportunity to use the option, implying that the value of the lost option
is an opportunity cost that must be added to the direct cost of the investment. Incorporating this
value into orthodox NPV and IRR evaluations would raise the costs or required rates of return that
must be "hurdled" in order to justify investing now, and so help managers to make more appropriate
capital investment decisions.
To the best of the author's knowledge, no preVIOUS published research on evaluating
agricultural investments in SA has attempted to incorporate the value of postponing a capital
investment when making NPV and IRR evaluations. Rather, past studies of the SA apple industry
have focused on evaluating national competitiveness by comparing SA fresh apple production and
market share performance with that of countries like Chile and France (Du Toit, 2000; Esterhuizen
and Van Rooyen, 1999; Steenkamp, 1999). The second aim of this study, therefore, is to show how
to modify NPV and IRR evaluations to account for uncertainty and irreversibility, and the value of
the option to postpone an investment, by comparing the potential profitability of investments in
Pink Lady and Golden Delicious apple orchards. Chapter 4 first discusses why the Pink Lady apple
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cultivar can play a role in improving the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export value chain
relative to more traditional SA apple cultivars like the Golden Delicious. Both the Pink Lady and
Golden Delicious cultivars are seen as good eating-out-of-hand and cooking apples. Chapter 4 then
explains how the option to postpone concept can be applied to capital budgeting using a model
proposed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and discusses the research methodology and data sources.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results and discusses the implications for managers wishing to use the
modified NPV and IRR approaches to make capital budgeting decisions. Finally, a concluding
chapter draws on the findings of Chapters 2 through 5, and discusses some policy and management
implications for decision-makers in the SA fresh apple export industry.
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CHAPTER 1
KEY CHALLENGES FACING THE SOUTH AFRICAN FRESH APPLE EXPORT VALUE
CHAIN
This chapter describes intensifying competition in the global fresh apple export market, and
shows how SA's fresh apple exports volumes compare with those from the rest of the world.
1.1 Intensifying Global Competition
Global rivalry among leading apple-exporting countries like SA, New Zealand, Chile and
France, is intensifying. World apple supplies of deciduous fruit have expanded more rapidly than
demand, such that global per capita supplies of apples and pears rose 31 and 56 per cent in the
1990's, respectively. Oversupply and low fresh apple demand growth, due to an aging total
population, the decline of traditional family households, more eating away from home, increased
competition from exotic fruits and increasing availability of competing snack foods, together
reduced real global apple prices by more than 25 per cent from about US$ 700 per ton in 1992 to
some US$ 430 per ton in 1999 (see Figure 1.1) (O'Rourke, 2001). No apparent recovery from these
levels has occurred since then, and sentiment is that real apple prices are unlikely to rise in the next
five years (Rabe, 2001). When demand for a product is growing slowly, and industry conditions
tempt stakeholders to use price cuts or other competitive weapons (like better packaging and
service) to boost unit sales, and when customer costs to switch to new suppliers are low (such as for
apple consumers), rivalry usually becomes more aggressive as competitors strive to dominate their
rivals (Thompson and Strickland, 1998: 76). If China's consumption of fresh apples falls behind its
considerable large and growing apple production - some 38 per cent of world annual production in
2001 - and there is continued excess supply on the world market, the most likely outcome will be to
raise the level of rivalry between apple exporting nations. According to O'Rourke (2001), rivalry
has already increased as apple-exporting countries have sought to sell more apples in developing
markets (e.g. the Middle East and Far East) other than the traditional European outlets. Typically,
SA fresh fruit exporters send about 75 per cent of all SA apples, pears and table grapes to the
European market, and 10 per cent to North American markets (Rabe, 2001).
8
Cleasby and Darroch (1991) estimated that the income elasticity of export demand for all
deciduous fruit in SA's major trading-partner countries was 1.41, suggesting that SA export
volumes would increase as real per capita incomes in importing countries rose. Per capita income
growth in Europe has, however, remained relatively stable in the last decade (IMF, 2001), and apple
export prices appeared to be driven more by supply conditions than demand forces. The only
published SA fresh apple price elasticity of demand estimate (-9.662) was reported by Vosloo and
Groenewald in 1969. Based on the more recent studies of international competitiveness of the SA
fresh apple export value chain, the next section gives a brief profile of global fresh apple markets
and considers the comparative performance of the SA fresh apple export value chain.
1.2 The SA Apple Industry in a Global Context
An estimated 4.76 million metric tons of apples, with a trading real value of US$ 2.76
billion (1999=100), crossed international borders in 1999 (FAO, 2001). France was the largest net
exporter of apples in the same year, followed by the United States (US) and Italy. In 2001, SA was
ranked the 21 st largest apple producer, and the eighth and ninth largest exporter of apples in 1999
and 2000; respectively. Regarding apple consumption, Germany remains the most important net
importer of apples, importing 0.73 million tons in 1999, followed by the UK and The Netherlands.
The 20 leading fresh apple producing countries during 1998 and 1999, the 20 largest fresh apple
exporters, and the major apple importing countries in 1999 and 2000 are listed in Appendix lA
(page 74 of the dissertation), Appendix ID (page 75) and Appendix le (page 76), respectively. In
its annual comparison of 27 major apple-producing countries, the World Apple Report found that
New Zealand was still overall the most competitive producer of apples, followed by Chile and The
Netherlands (World Apple Report, 2001b). South Africa - ranked ninth overall- was better placed
in categories reflecting Production Efficiency (fifth), Infrastructure and Inputs (seventh), than in the
Financial and Markets category (sixteenth). Appendix 2 shows the competitiveness position of each
of the 27 apple exporting countries in each of these three categories.
Steenkamp (1999) stated that "[apple] trade promotion efforts face an uphill task that
requires looking at bottlenecks... and both the supply and demand side" (Steenkamp, 1999: 8). In
contrast, Esterhuizen and Van Rooyen (1999) used a relative market share approach to show that
SA fresh apple producers were internationally competitive and competitiveness appeared to
improve through "value adding" activities, such as apple juicing. Neither of these two studies tried
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to isolate possible sources of competitive advantage or disadvantage, and furthermore, neither made
recommendations to improve the performance of the SA fresh apple industry. In a later study, Du
Toit (2000) compared the competitiveness of the SA apple value chain and the Chilean apple
industry, with particular emphasis on the supply of fresh apples to the European market from these
two countries. The aim was to isolate sources of national competitive advantage using four broad
areas of investigation, including: firstly, industry structure, strategy and competition; secondly,
factor conditions; thirdly, supporting industries; and lastly, demand conditions. Following the
definition of national competitive advantage given by Porter (1990: 23) [that is, " ... the specific
characteristics of a nation's national circumstances that enables a specific industry within that
nation to create and maintain competitive advantage"], Du Toit (2000) indicates that Chile's
favourable natural resources gave it a significant competitive advantage. Support services in Chile
also play a role in creating overall competitiveness, particularly those services providing market
information. Chile appears to have a better flow of apple price and quality information through the
apple value chain than does SA, and better signaling of changing consumer tastes and consumer
buying patterns. Simultaneously, South American apple exporters are disadvantaged by high
transportation costs, and SA exports can be delivered in Europe at 60 per cent of the transportation
cost ofa Chilean exporter (DaIl, 2001).
1.3 Profile of the SA Fresh Apple Industry
The 522 fresh apple producers in SA as of2001 operate mainly in the Western Cape and the
Langkloof East regions of SA. About 76 per cent of these producers use one of the 37 SA
packhouses offering apple-packing services. A list of packers provided by the Deciduous Fruit
Producers' Trust (DFTP) suggests that about 54 per cent of packers now function as private
companies, most of which probably operated under a co-operative governance and financial
structure prior to deregulation in 1996. Packers typically provide sorting, storage and packing
services, while export agencies are responsible for the export transportation, logistics, marketing,
finance and administration functions once apple delivery at the packhouse is made by the apple
grower. Exporters generally carry out business on a "consignment" basis, meaning ownership of the
product remains with the apple producer until the wholesaler point-of-sale, whereupon exporters
charge a commission for services rendered. The apple exporter usually then reimburses the packer
on behalf ofthe apple producer, before a final transfer of proceeds to the apple producer is made.
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temperature in the "cold chain", examination of ship temperatures and daily recording of perishable
shipments leaving SA ports (Finn, 2001). Despite statutory obligation, the Board is financed
independently and is expected to cover operational costs through competitive service fees.
Given increased rivalry in global fresh apple markets and the likelihood that real world
apple prices will remain relatively lower in the next five years, SA fresh apple export value chain
players need to come together and address the constraints that prohibit the SA apple industry from
becoming more internationally competitive. The next chapter introduces value chain principles as
the basis for developing a conceptual model that can help to investigate how to improve cooperation
in order to make the SA fresh apple export value chain more competitive.
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COOPERATION IN, AND COMPETITIVENESS OF, THE SOUTH AFRICAN FRESH
APPLE EXPORT VALUE CHAIN
Improved competitiveness in the SA fresh apple export value chain can be achieved by
creating a cost advantage and/or a product differentiation/value added advantage (Porter, 1985;
Kennedy et al., 1997), such that the greater the advantage, the greater the firm's competitive
capacity and ability to withstand strategic moves and attacks by rivals. This chapter first discusses
how value chain concepts can play a strategic role in helping firms create and sustain competitive
advantage. After discussion of research by Porter (1985), the development of supply chain concepts,
and the evolution from Resourced-based to Relational-based competitive theory, a value chain
approach to evaluate how the SA fresh apple industry can become more internationally competitive
is discussed in section 2.1, emphasizing trust as a key success factor for building more effective
value chain relationships. A conceptual model of cooperative behaviour among the players in a
typical value chain is outlined as a basis for developing generic research hypotheses - in section
2.1.3 - that are then applied to the case of the SA fresh apple export value chain in section 2.1.4.
Chapter 2 ends with a description of the research methodology and data sources used to analyze the
key aspects ofcooperative relationships between players in the SA fresh apple export value chain.
2.1 Key Value Chain Principles
The need to capitalize on all resources and capabilities in the value chain (including
collective reputation, brand names, trust, and knowledge management) has encouraged a theoretical
movement away from firm versus firm competitive analysis to a system versus system analysis
(0 'Keeffe, 1998a). The relaxation of legal and managerial firm boundaries mirrors the concept of a
value chain, which Porter (1985) - similar to Handfield and Nichols (1999) cited in the dissertation
introduction - defines as the process in which multiple enterprises within a shared market
cooperatively plan, implement, and manage the flow of goods, services, and information from point
of origin to point of consumption. Firms are viewed in the context of an interconnected system
where the actions of input suppliers and forward channel allies directly impact the operating and
financial performance of an associated firm. The evolution of supply chain management theory
reflects value chain concepts by focusing on improving production and marketing systems through
quicker player responsiveness to changing consumer tastes, and by finding ways to reduce
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distribution costs (Ricks eta/., 1999; Titus, 1995). Supply chain management also emphasizes how
the design and the nature of the inter-linkages between value chain players can lead to competitive
advantage by defining and benchmarking the specific responsibilities, actions and performance for
each function along the value chain (Maurer and Wright, 1998).
Resource-based theory proposes that a firm must develop resources and capabilities that are
valuable, rare and difficult to substitute or copy, and that intangible assets - such as corporate
reputation and brand names - can be used to strengthen the competitive advantage created by
differentiation and/or low-cost strategies. Although the Resource-based view helps managers to
understand the sources of competitive advantage emanating from within the boundaries of the firm,
it overlooks the potential advantages and disadvantages that result from interaction between linked
firms (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Recent studies suggest that productivity gains leading to competitive
advantage in the value chain are possible when value chain partners are willing to make relation-
specific investments and combine resources in unique ways (Dyer, 1997). These studies show that
firms that cooperate and form unique relationships with trading partners are likely to benefit from
one of four documented sources of competitive advantage: (1) investments in relation-specific
assets; (2) substantial knowledge exchange (often leading to joint learning); (3) combining of
complementary resources and capabilities; and (4) lower transactions cost (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
As a working definition, cooperation refers to similar or complementary coordinated actions taken
by firms in independent relationships to achieve mutual or singular outcomes with expected
reciprocation over time (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Higher levels of cooperation imply better
business relationships between members ofa value chain.
2.1.1 Cooperation and Trust
Social factors that contribute to the formation and maintenance of cooperative relationships
include the beliefs, attitudes, values and goals held by the players (Smith et aI., 1995). Mutual trust
helps to build shared values between the players and to reduce the risks of doing business (Bamey
and Hansen, 1994; Dyer, 1997). Nitschke and O'Keeffe (1999) emphasize the role that trust
experiences have played in developing vertical and horizontal relationships between growers and
marketers in the Australian grain industry, concluding that the successful management of the supply
chain was attributable to this valuable and rare resource. Similarly, McKay (1993) and Hunt et al.
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(2002) found that mutual trust must be present before a strategic alliance can flourish. Galizzian
and Venturini (1999) show that cooperation tends to be rather vulnerable and unstable in the
absence of trust. Cooperation, therefore, is likely to be stronger the more trust that the players have
in their business relationships with one another.
In evaluating trust-based supply relationships in SA, Tregurtha and Vink (1999) highlighted
the complexities involved in building commercial supply relationships, noting that institutional-
based trust, characteristic-based trust and process-based trust were three prerequisites for long-term
sustainability. Private and public institutions operating at the industry level can promote trust, and
reduce transactions costs, through establishing and maintaining certainty about industry trade
procedures and protocols (Ortmann, 2000). Non-compliance with these codes of conduct can result
in exclusion from a representative group (such as the DFPT) along with any group privileges, such
as access to market statistics and information. Institutional-based trust is most effective, therefore,
when the parties involved would rationally avoid high external (legal) costs resulting from contract
violation, or when the benefits of group membership are economically valuable (Tregurtha and
Vink, 1999).
Commercial trustworthiness of a firm is established through the revealed customs, culture
and codes of conduct particular to that business (Thompson and Strickland, 1998), which are often
embodied in the firm's "mission statement". Morrow et al. (1999) indicate that the level of trust can
be based, at times, solely upon the character of the associated parties, regardless of the governance
structure prescribing the behavior of the players involved. Here, the first party reasons that a
violation or breach of trust by the second party would trigger an internal cost that the second party
would rationally avoid because of the particular character of the second party. The internal cost of
violating one's own character is considered to be as strong a deterrent to opportunistic behaviour as
the external costs imposed by other types of governance mechanisms. Evidences of pure
characteristic-based trust are rare (Morrow et aI., 1999), but, nonetheless, illustrate the valuable role
that trust can play in reducing the costs ofparticipating in a market.
The Australian grain industry example used by Nitschke and O'Keefe (1999) stresses the
ongoing need to develop and improve trust throughout the duration of the contract. Process-based
trust implies frequent, meaningful contact, and an openness and eagerness to share knowledge and
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infonnation (of a technical, market, operational or financial nature) that is mutually beneficial
(Tregurtha and Vink, 1999). Arms-length decision-making weakens the impact of incentives for
firms to cooperate, and diminishes the expected rewards from renewing a contract. Boehlje et al.
(1999) - who also stress the significance of trust in inter-firm relationships - point out that
successful coordination involves matching good (poor) perfonnance with the appropriate rewards
(penalties). Implementing a robust and trustworthy incentive structure that best rewards a party's
fulfillment of their obligations is a key challenge when seeking to build a successful value chain.
2.1.2 Cooperative Behaviour, Commitment and Competitiveness
The optimization of production and operations, lower transactions costs, and the
appropriation of property rights are sources of value that can result from more effective vertical
linkages (Lazzarini et aI., 2001). The need to improve downstream perfonnance by, for example,
adapting to market changes, can lead downstream players to cooperate more closely with upstream
finns to cut costs, improve product quality, develop new products,. etc. (Browning et al., 1995;
Langfield-Smith and Greenwood, 1998). Following Heide and John (1990) and Campbell (1992),
the degree of cooperation between finns can be evaluated by studying the cooperative behaviour
characteristics within that relationship. Joint problem-solving, communication, monitoring,
adaptations, joint decision-making and assistance offered are all inter-finn behaviours that are
associated with cooperation (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Frazier et aI., 1988). What aspect of
cooperative behaviour to focus on depends on the unique key success factors in a particular value
chain (Hardman et aI., 2002). For example, finns in technology-related industries should be
concerned about working jointly on scientific innovation, testing and performance problems and
making appropriate adaptations to current operations, while firms in marketing and service-related
industries might focus more on aspects of communication, such as fast and courteous customer
assistance, accurately recording how customer needs are changing, and ways to maximize net
returns on advertising.
Stronger cooperative behaviour between the players makes exiting from the relationship
undesirable, and causes a deeper commitment from the players to the value chain to overcome
factors that constrain its future competitiveness. Over time, the players are likely to learn more
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about the external and internal environments in which the value chain operates, the task of the value
chain, each other and how to work together, their respective skills, and how to mould compatible
goals. They are then likely to be more committed to reevaluate their linkages and to implement
necessary changes to make the value chain perform better (Doz, 1996; Heide and John, 1990;
Steffel, 2000). An unfavourable reputation with final buyers, lack of production and operating
flexibility, and declining product and service quality through the value chain, are examples of
competitive disadvantages that all players need to commit to solving before competitiveness can
improve. Commitment to a trading relationship can be defined - in a behavioural sense - by the
amount of long-term idiosyncratic investments made by the value chain partners (Campbell, 1992).
A conceptual model of the links between trust, cooperation and commitment described above is
developed in the next section as a basis for driving research hypotheses for this study.
2.1.3 A Conceptual Model ofTrust, Cooperation and Human Resource Commitment
The value chain concepts outlined in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 above imply that the level of
cooperation is determined by the level of trust between players in a value chain, and that the level of
human resource commitment depends on the level of cooperation. Causality, therefore, runs from
TRUST -7 COOPERATION -7 HUMAN RESOURCE COMMITMENT (Anderson and Weitz,
1991; Campbell, 1992; Hunt et a!., 2002; Smith et a!., 1995). Based on these elements, stronger
commitment implies a greater ability to deal more effectively with obstacles that constrain the
competitiveness of a value chain. Appropriate research hypotheses to investigate this generic
conceptual model can thus be summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 1(a): The higher are the levels oftrust that producers (upstream players) have in their
working relationships with packers and exporters (downstream players), the greater will be the
level of cooperative behaviour as evidenced by higher levels of joint problem-solving,
communication, monitoring, adaptations, joint decision-making, and assistance offered.
Hypothesis (1b): The higher are the levels ofjoint problem-solving, communication, monitoring,
adaptations, joint decision-making, and assistance offered, the greater will be the level ofhuman
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resources that producers (upstream players) will commit to their working relationships with
packers and exporters (downstream players).
Past research by Boehlje et al. (1999), Doz (1996), and O'Keeffe (1997; 1998b), suggests
that the process of building trust and implementing cooperation will be helped if the partners
monitor changes in the external and internal environment, and evaluate the risks associated with
their investments in the value chain. This helps them to identify the key barriers or constraints to
chain competitiveness over time, and how best to adjust to, and manage, these factors for mutual
benefit. The third plausible research hypothesis for the generic conceptual model, therefore, is:
Hypothesis 1(c): Identifying and communicating the key barriers or constraints that limit value
chain competitiveness will improve the players' understanding of each other's business and of
where resources must be committed to jointly solve problems.
The above generic conceptual model is adapted in the next section to indicate the research
hypotheses that were applied in this study to try and evaluate how players in the SA fresh apple
export value chain can improve cooperation to make this value chain more competitive.
2.1.4 Applying the Conceptual Model to the Case of the SA Fresh Apple Export
Value Chain
Fresh apples are highly perishable and many factors affect apple quality, implying that
players in the SA fresh apple export value chain must constantly communicate about aspects such as
the effect of recent weather patterns, how crops are responding to chemical sprays, and current
levels of fruit ripeness2. Maintaining and improving product freshness, and dealing with supply
shocks caused by hail damage, disease (codling moth), etc. often involves trying to solve associated
logistical and fruit quality problems. Personal interviews with experts in the SA apple industry3
during 2001 indicate that the industry must give more attention to joint problem-solving and
2 Once apples are delivered to the packhouse, packers sort, store and pack the apples, and then export agencies carry out
export transportation, logistics, marketing, finance and administration functions on behalf of the apple producer.
3 Mr P. Dall (Chairman, Deciduous Fruit Producers' Trust), Mr P. Finn (Group Manager: Quality Services, Perishable
Products Export Control Board), Mr V. Jensen (Chairman, Fresh Products Exporters' Forum), and Mr A. Rabe
(Managing Director, Deciduous Fruit Producers' Trust).
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communication, in particular, to try and respond to falling export revenues (caused by lower real
world apple prices) and greater rivalry in export markets. These experts also identify production
planning, delivery scheduling, apple marketing and quality control, as key activities in the SA fresh
apple export value chain that are related to cooperative behaviour. To assess what may influence SA
producers of fresh apple exports to 'cooperate with packers and exporters to be more competitive',
this study adapts hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) in the generic conceptual model outlined in section 2.1.3
above and tests the following a priori expectations about players in the SA fresh apple export value
chain:
Hypothesis 2(a): The higher are the levels of trust that SA apple producers have in their working
relationships with apple packers and exporters, the greater will be the level of cooperative
behaviour as evidenced by higher levels ofjointproblem-solving and communication.
Hypothesis 2(b): The higher are the levels ofjoint problem-solving and communication, the greater
will be the level of human resources that SA apple producers will commit to their working
relationships with packers and exporters.
Hypothesis 1(c) in the generic conceptual model can also be adapted by listing potential key
constraints that limit the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export value chain and then having
the players evaluate these constraints and add any others that they may deem appropriate. Drawing
from research by Eidman (1990), Sonka and Patrick (1984), and Woodbum et al. (1995) on the
sources of risk in agriculture, and personal interviews held with SA apple industry experts, it is
expected a priori that:
Hypothesis 2(c): Committing human and other resources to managing constraints like poor climatic
conditions, the withdrawal ofgovernment export incentives, greater rivalry in export markets, high
interest rates, and the production and marketing of inappropriate apple cultivars, can help SA
apple producers, packers and exporters to improve the competitiveness ofthe SA fresh apple export
value chain.
The next section discusses the sources of data and the research methodology used to assess
these three research hypotheses for the case of the SA fresh apple export value chain.
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2.2 Data Sources and Research Methodology
The target population of 522 apple producers, 37 apple packers and 14 apple exporters in the
Western Cape and LangkloofEast regions of SA were sent questionnaires by post or e-mail in April
and May 2001, or personally interviewed during July 2001, to obtain information about (1) the
degree of trust, joint problem-solving, communication, and human resources commitment, between
them in the SA fresh apple export value chain; (2) their levels of cooperation in production
planning, harvest scheduling, apple marketing and quality control; and (3) the factors that they
perceive constrain the industry from becoming more competitive internationally (see the full
producer questionnaire as an example in Appendix 3, page 78 of the dissertation). The Langkloof
East and Western Cape regions were chosen for this study because 83 and 14 per cent of
commercial apple trees grown in SA are situated in these areas, respectively (CIAMD, 2001). The
five largest apple packers in SA (dealing with 34 per cent of fresh apple exports), the seven largest
apple exporters (handling 68 per cent of fresh apple exports) and 37 producers returned usable
questionnaires.
Production, handling, or marketing of fresh apples constituted the core business activity for
all of the respondents, but typically each firm engaged in some enterprise diversification, such as
pear production (92 per cent of producer respondents), stone fruit production (69 per cent of
producers respondents) or grape, livestock, dairy, cut-flower or guava enterprises (see Table 2.1
overleaf). Given the complementarities between the SA fresh apple export value chain and the SA
fresh pear and stone fruit value chains in activities such as fruit sorting, storage, packing and cold-
chain transportation, the findings of this study could possibly help SA pear and stone fruit value
chain players find ways to become more competitive internationally. Over the last three years, the
average apple output by producer respondents was about 2731 tons per annum - which contributed
on average about 54 per cent (median = 70 per cent) to total turnover - with the largest apple
producer recording 17167 tons per year over the three years. Some 33 per cent of producer
respondents indicated that their business was operated as a Trust, while 23, 23, 15 and six per cent
operate as a private company, individual owner, partnership or a close corporation, respectively.
Respondents were generally unwilling to provide financial information and, therefore, financial
analyses of the firms' performance are not presented.
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Another 30 producers indicated during personal interviews that they did not have time to
complete a full questionnaire but would briefly describe the nature of their relationships with
packers and exporters, and identify constraints that limit the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple
export value chain. These producers' comments supported the links between trust, cooperation and
resource commitment, and the major constraints that were identified after the 37 usable producer
questionnaires were analyzed as reported in Chapter 3.
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics of, and cases of enterprise diversification by, sample fresh
apple producers (n=37), packers (n=5) and exporters (0=7) in the SA apple export
value chain, 1998-2000.
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Average output (1998-2000) (!onslYear)
Producer 2731 1184 4 17167
Packer 22653 16922 3216 62000








Apples 37 100 54.0
Citrus 8 22 8.6
Stone Fruit 25 69 13.9
Pears 33 92 19.3
Grapes 4 11 14.4
Dairy 4 11 13.6
Vegetables 6 17 23.6
Livestock 11 31 7.2
Wheat 2 6 5.6
Flowers 5 14 17.0
Other 3 8 28.6
Packer
Apples 5 100 76.6
Citrus 3 60 2.8
Stone Fruit 4 80 3.6
Pears 5 100 17.0
Exporter
Apples 7 100 33.4
Citrus 4 57 27.1
Stone Fruit 5 71 10.0
Pears 7 100 13.1
Grapes 5 17 15.6
Sub-Tropical Fruit 3 42 0.7
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Individual producer's perceived levels of trust in their working relationships with packers
and exporters were estimated using an index derived from their scores on Likert-type scales that
showed how strongly they agreed or disagreed with five statements including "We have a strong
personal confidence in each other", "We have a strong business confidence in each other," and "We
can always rely on each other when it counts" (see Table 2.2 overleaf). To avoid neutral responses
(do not agree or disagree with the statements), respondents had to select one of four responses -
strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree - for each statement. For example, producers
that strongly agreed with a statement scored a four, while those that strongly disagreed scored a one.
An index of the level of trust perceived by each producer was then estimated by taking hislher
average score over the five statements that related to aspects of trust in the business relationship.
For example, ifhe/she scored a 2,3,3,3 and 2 for the five statements, he/she scored 2.6 on the level
of trust index ([2 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 2]/5). Estimated trust index scores for producers ranged from 2.00 to
4.00, with a mean score of 3.10 for the sample. Index values above 3.5 indicate high levels oftrust,
while values below 1.5 suggest low levels of trust in the working relationship.
Individual producer's perceived levels of communication, joint problem-solving and human
resource commitment in working relationships with packers and exporters were similarly estimated
by averaging their Likert-type scores for linked statements (also given in Table 2.2) about each of
these behaviours. High communication scores imply that respondents strongly agreed with
statements like "We often discuss issues such as changes in technology and market conditions", and
"We have extensive formal and informal communications", and strongly disagreed that "We discuss
only need-to-know information that relates directly to our relationship". Producers who perceived
high levels of joint problem-solving strongly agreed that they make joint decisions about reducing
exporting costs in the packhouse, delivery schedules, and fruit quality control, and that both players
worked together to achieve productivity gains for mutual benefit. Individual levels of human
resource commitment were estimated by whether producers agreed or disagreed that "We devote
considerable time trying to improve this relationship", and "We devote considerable time trying to
improve the packer's productivity", and that they had made a substantial number of adaptations in
their delivery schedule in order to deal more effectively with a packer.
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Table 2.2. Questions used to capture SA apple producer perceptions about the levels of
trust, cooperation (joint problem-solving and communication) and commitment
between players in the SA fresh apple export value chain.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your
relationship with your packer (please mark the appropriate block)?
Statement Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
A~ree Disa2ree
Trust
We have a strong personal confidence in each
other
We have a strong business confidence in each
other
We can always rely on each other when it
counts
I believe this packer will work hard in the future
to maintain a close relationship with mv firm
I am very confident that this relationship will
continue in the future
Communication
We often discuss issues such as changes in
technology and market conditions
We have extensive formal and informal
communications
We discuss only need-to-know information that
relates directly to our relationship
Joint-Problem-Solving
We make joint decisions about:
Reducing costs in the packhouse
Delivery scheduling
Quality control
In this relationship, both sides work together to
achieve productivity gains from which both
sides benefit
Commitment
We devote considerable time trying to improve
this relationship
We devote considerable time trying to improve
the packer's productivity
We have made a substantial number of
adaptations in our delivery schedule in order to
deal more effectively with this packer
Producers, packers and exporters were also asked to rank their perceptions about the level of
cooperation in production planning, harvest scheduling, apple marketing, and quality control on
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Likert-type scales from one (very low) to five (very high). Table 2.3 shows the format of this
question used to assess producer perceptions about the level of cooperation in these activities for the
producer-packer link. Finally, producer, packer and exporters' perceptions of the major barriers
that limit SA fresh apple export value chain competitiveness were elicited by asking them to rank
the set of potential constraints listed in Table 2.4 on page 24 on Likert-type scales from one (minor
constraint) to five (major constraint). As explained in section 2.1.4 above, these constraints are
developed with reference to past research on the sources of risk in agriculture, personal interviews
held with SA apple industry experts, and academics with knowledge of the current drivers of
change in SA agribusiness (Darroch, 2001; Ortmann, 2001). The players were also requested to
score any other constraint(s) that they wanted to add to the hypothesized list.
Table 2.3. Questions used to capture SA fresh apple producers' perceptions about the level
of cooperation with packers in key SA fresh apple export value chain activities.
How would you describe the level of cooperation between you and your packer in the











Based on the 37 usable producer questionnaires, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
was applied to estimate recursive models (Gujarati, 1995: 680) to test the adapted hypotheses 2(a)
and 2(b) for the producer-packer link and the producer-export link in the SA fresh apple export
value chain. Each recursive model showed how the level of cooperation between the two players
(joint problem-solving and/or communication) depends on the level of trust, and, in turn, how the
level of human resource commitment by producers depends on the level of cooperation (joint
problem-solving and/or communication) between the two players. These models, therefore, reflect
the unilateral causal chain relationship from trust to cooperation to human resource commitment
specified in the generic conceptual model of cooperative behaviour outlined in section 2.1.3. The
levels of trust, cooperation (joint problem-solving and communication), and human resource
commitment were represented by the estimated producer index scores for these concepts derived
from the Likert-type scales as explained above.
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Table 2.4. List of potential constraints that limit the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple
export value chain.
In your opinion, what are the major obstacles hindering the SA apple export industry from
becoming more competitive? Rate the following aspects on a scale of 1 (minor constraint) to 5




1 2 3 4 5
Abandoning of fiuit handling protocols through the supply
chain
Ageing apple exporting infrastructure
Climatic conditions
Crime
Current levels of investment in research and development
(R & D) of apple cultivars




Increased competition from Southern Hemisphere
countries
Lack of foreign investment into SA
Lack ofmarket information
Lack of training and human development
No government export incentives
Over-capitalization at packhouses
Production and marketing of inappropriate apple cultivars




The next chapter presents the empirical results of the recursive models of the links between
trust, cooperation and human resource commitment in the SA fresh apple export value chain, and
give respondents' rankings ofthe key constraints an the chain's competitiveness.
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CHAPTER 3
COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FRESH APPLE VALUE CHAIN: RESULTS
AND DISCUSSION
Producer scores for their perceived levels of trust, cooperation and human resource
commitment with packers and exporters in the SA fresh apple export value chain are reported in
section 3.1. The estimated OLS recursive models of expected relationships between these factors, as
summarized in hypothesis 2(a) and 2(b) in Chapter 2, are then reported in section 3.2. Perceived
constraints on chain competitiveness are then presented in section 3.3. A discussion of these results
concludes the chapter.
3.1 Index Scores for the Perceived Levels of Trust, Joint Problem-solving,
Communication and Human Resource Commitment
The mean, minimum, and maximum index scores showing SA fresh apple producers'
perceived levels of trust, cooperation Goint problem-solving and communication) and human
resource commitment in their working relationships with fresh apple packers and exporters are
reported in Table 3.1 on page 27. Scores for the producer-packer link ranged from 1.50 for joint
problem-solving, to a maximum of 4.00 for trust, joint problem-solving and human resource
commitment. Mean scores close to 3.00 for all four aspects of the relationships suggest that
producers in the sample, on average, perceive relatively high levels of trust, joint problem-solving,
and communication in their relationships with packers, and that producers are quite strongly
committed to these relationships. Scores for the producer-exporter link ranged from 1.00 for joint
problem-solving and communication to a maximum of 4.00 for all surveyed aspects of the link.
Given mean scores again close to 3.00, producers in the sample, on average, seem to perceive
relatively high levels of trust, joint problem-solving, and communication in their relationships with
exporters, and are quite strongly committed to these relationships.
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Table 3.1. Producer scores for their perceived levels of trust, joint problem-solving,
communication and human resource commitment in working relationships with
packers and exporters in the SA fresh apple export value chain.
Packer relationship· Exporter relationship·
Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.Aspect of index Index index index index index
Relationship Error Errorscore score score score score score
Trust 2.00 4.00 3.10 0.557 1.60 4.00 3.09 0.658
Joint Problem- 1.50 4.00 2.69 0.754 1.00 4.00 2.78 0.814
Solving
Communication 1.67 3.67 2.91 0.499 1.00 4.00 2.71 0.725
Human Resource 2.00 4.00 2.72 0.533 1.67 4.00 3.13 0.567
Commitment
a Scores ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree) indicate to what extent producers agree or disagree
with statements linked to aspects of their packer and exporter relationships. Scores near 1 suggest a perceived weak
aspect of the relationship, while scores near 4 indicate a strong aspect.
3.2 Recursive Models of the Trust - Cooperation - Commitment Link
The estimated recursive models, as expected, showed that higher levels of trust encouraged
more upstream cooperative behaviour in the SA fresh apple export value chain. In the producer-
packer recursive model, the level of perceived trust (TRUST) had a positive impact on the level of
joint problem-solving (JPS) between these players (equation (3.1 ». Greater levels ofjoint problem-
solving between them also lead to greater levels of human resource commitment (RES) by
producers to the working relationship (equation (3.2». Estimated t values for equation (3.1) and
equation (3.2) are given in parentheses, ** and *** indicate statistically significant estimated
coefficients at the 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively, and df show the number of
degrees of freedom. These results give some support to hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b) about
determinants of cooperation and human resource commitment derived in section 2.1.3 and 2.1.4
above. The level of communication was not statistically significantly related to either TRUST or
RES, and so this aspect of cooperation was omitted from the reported producer-packer recursive
model.







AdjustedIf = 0.191 F= 6.649**




AdjustedIf = 0.119 F =4.229** df= 35
In the producer-exporter recursive model, TRUST had a positive effect on the level of
communication (COMM) between these players (equation (3.3)). The level ofjoint problem-solving
(JPS) was not statistically significantly related to TRUST, but was significantly related to both
COMM and RES. To overcome the multicollinearity problem between JPS and COMM, RES was
regressed on a principal component, defined as "Cooperation" (COOPN), that explained 79.43 per
cent of the variation in JPS and COMM. The positive relationship between COOPN and RES
implies that higher levels of communication and joint problem-solving encouraged producers to
commit more human resources to this working relationship (equation (3.4)). Estimated t values for
equation (3.3) and equation (3.4) are given in parentheses, *** showing statistically significant
estimated coefficients at the 1% level of significance, and df again shows the number of degrees of
freedom. These results also give some support to hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b) about
determinants of cooperation and human resource commitment derived in section 2.1.3 and 2.14.
Producer-Exporter link: COMM = 0.466 + 0.727 TRUST
(0.925) (4.565)***
AdjustedIf = 0.415 F = 20.842*** df= 35
(3.3)






Adjusted R! = 0.230 F = 9.386*** df= 35
The next section reports on the perceived levels of cooperation between producers, packers
and exports in production planning, delivery scheduling, apple marketing and quality control, and
how these players ranked perceived constraints that limit the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple
export value chain.
3.3 Overall Cooperation and the Perceived Constraints on the Competitiveness of
the SA Fresh Apple Value Chain
Producer, packer and exporter perceptions of their levels of cooperation with each other
regarding key activities in the SA fresh apple export value chain are summarized in Table 3.2
below using average scores that could range from one (very low cooperation) to five (very high
cooperation).
Table 3.2. Respondents' scores for their perceived levels of cooperation with other players in





























a Scores were based on the players' perceptions of the level of cooperation for each activity in the SA fresh· apple export
value chain, and could range from I (very low cooperation) to 5 (very high cooperation).
Producers VIew overall cooperation with packers as "moderate" to "high", with high
cooperation in delivery scheduling and quality control. They also perceive that exporter cooperation
is "low" to "moderate", with low cooperation regarding fruit quality control. Similarly, exporters
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felt that overall producer cooperation was "moderate", with production planning and delivery
scheduling as activities where the least cooperation exists. Production planning involves, among
other things, planting new apple cultivars and the cultivars that final consumers demand. As
retailers are becoming more selective about which apple cultivars they will stock to meet
consumers' needs (World Apple Report, 2001a), producers that grow an inappropriate mix of apple
cultivars will find their access to some markets restricted and will become less competitive. Table
3.2 shows that there is still scope to improve the level of overall cooperation between these three
players in the SA fresh apple export value chain. The players' rankings of the key constraints that
limit SA fresh apple export value chain competitiveness that are shown in Table 3.3 identify further
aspects that they need to communicate about, commit resources to, and jointly solve.
Table 3.3. Respondents' rankings of the key constraints on SA fresh apple export value
chain competitiveness.
Constraint Ranking of Constraintsa
Producers Packers Exporters
Climatic conditions 4 1 1
No government export incentives 1 2 6
Increased competition from rival apple-exporting countries 5 6 2
Restrictive government labour policy 2 3 9
High interest rates 3 6 3
Production and marketing of inappropriate apple cultivars 13 3 9
Harbour terminal bottlenecks 16 6 4
Lack of training and human development 14 10 4
Relaxation offruit handling protocols through the supply chain 8 5 7
Over-capitalization at packhouses 6 10 8
Lack of independent market information 6 14 9
Exporter inexperience in international trade 10 6 13
Exporter liquidity problems 17 12 9
Ageing apple exporting infrastructure 9 14 15
Current levels of investment in R &D of apple cultivars 10 12 15
Crime 12 16 17
Lack offoreign investment into SA 15 17 13
a Rankings are based on the players' average scores on each constraint, which ranged from 1 (minor constraint) to 5
(major constraint). Constraints are listed in descending order of importance according to the lowest total across the
respondent classes.
Producers ranked the recent withdrawal of government export incentives, restrictive labour
policy, business (climate) and financial (interest rate) risks, rival exporters, and lack of independent
market information as the six main constraints they face currently. Climatic conditions were ranked
the top current constraint by packers and exporters, probably reflecting concerns that they and
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producers have about the effect of recent drought on the overall "pack-out" (quality distribution) of
recent apple crops. Poor quality apples are channeled away from packing and exporting facilities
towards juicing and other processing plants. This cuts packer and exporter volumes, and thus
reduces their competitiveness by driving up operating costs per unit. Total annual apple production
in SA remained stable in the last decade, but export (high value) volumes fell by 11 and 22 per cent
in 1999 and 2000, respectively, due to warm and dry winters.
Apple packers also ranked the lack of export incentives and restrictive labour policy in their
top three constraints, but seemed more concerned than producers and exporters about whether an
appropriate mix of apple cultivars was being produced and marketed. Packers viewed the relaxation
of pre-harvest and post-harvest fruit handling protocols as their fifth ranked constraint. Although
ranked slightly lower by producers and exporters, this constraint reflects concerns about the
potential effect of market deregulation on the quality and "image" of SA fruit exports now that
more fruit classes are exported than before deregulation in 1996. Packers ranked exporter trade
experience, harbour terminal bottlenecks, high interest rates and rival international exporters jointly
as the sixth most pressing constraint. Exporters ranked rivalry, high interest rates and terminal
bottlenecks in their top four constraints, along with a lack of training and human development. They
perceived that harbour terminal bottlenecks, and training and development were more pressing
constraints than did producers and packers. With an understanding of these perceived constraints,
the players can now make better decisions about where to allocate scarce human and other resources
in order to improve the international competitiveness of the SA apple export value chain. The
constraints identified in Table 3.3 give some support to the hypothesis 1(e) and 2(e) derived above
in sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.
3.4 Discussion
In the SA fresh apple export value chain, higher levels of trust lead to more joint problem-
solving between producers and packers and to more communication between producers and
exporters. More joint problem-solving between producers and packers encouraged producers to
commit greater levels of human resources to the working relationship. At the producer-exporter
link, higher levels of both communication and joint problem-solving lead to higher human resource
commitment by producers to the relationship. These players could cooperate more closely on
32
delivery scheduling and quality control to promote the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export
value chain. These efforts can be assisted if the players communicate more about what are, and how
to overcome, the perceived key constraints that limit competitiveness.
Although the three players rank the main constraints differently, and some factors are more
specific to each player, there is broad agreement on some of the constraints that must be addressed.
Climatic conditions are essentially beyond the players' control and affect the delivery quantity and
quality of SA apple exports. Patrick et al. (1985), and Woodbum et al. (1995) also identified yield
(weather) variability as a major source of risk for US and SA crop farmers, respectively, while
Wermund and Fearne (2000) cite variable climate as a major constraint on production in the British
stone fruit industry. The withdrawal of export incentives will affect the sustainability of those
producers that were most heavily dependent on this assistance. The policy question is whether these
producers would exit the industry without support due to a lack of appropriate management skills.
The SA government is currently addressing calls from the business community to reduce the
transaction costs of implementing new labour legislation. This would improve the medium-term
viability of producers facing lower real world apple prices. Local interest rates are likely to remain
relatively high in nominal and real terms, implying that more leveraged players must give more
attention to debt management and consider strategies like debt roll-over, debt consolidation and
possible mergers.
All three players acknowledge the threat posed by rival global fresh apple exporters. In
European markets, particularly the UK, quality and price competition from apple producers in
France and Chile are the main threat. In this regard, more timeous provision of information on
where apple consignments leaving SA ports are destined for, could help SA exporters to make
better decisions about where and when to send apples to avoid problems of over-supply (and lower
prices) on specific markets. The PPECB currently collects these data, but information dissemination
is delayed by up to six months. Exporters need to consider working with the Board to improve this
turn-around time, or consider alternative price information sources - provided that the benefits of
timely access to consignment information outweigh the cost ofaccessing such data.
The longer-term question is whether or not competitiveness could be improved by growing a
better mix of traditional and new apple cultivars. Fresh apple marketing experts emphasize that SA
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apple producers need to become more responsive to changing international fresh apple consumers'
preferences, although producer views could reflect the limited scope for producing new apple
cultivars in SA, especially in areas where there is a lack of sufficiently cold conditions to promote
fruit colouring, taste and yields. Potential adopters of new apple cultivars may also be concerned
about the uncertain yields, prices and production costs once a new cultivar has been adopted. As
explained above, the World Apple Report (2001) indicates that apple cultivars such as Gala and
Pink Lady are becoming increasingly popular, yet these contribute only about 10 per cent of the
annual SA crop. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 partly address these concerns by using modified NPV and
IRR capital budgeting methods to evaluate and compare the relative profitability of Golden
Delicious (traditional cultivar) and Pink Lady apple orchard investments for SA apple producers.
This information can help to show whether producing more Pink Lady apples could provide a better
mix of traditional and new apple cultivars for the SA fresh apple export value chain.
All three players need to focus on quality control, given the perceived lack of cooperation in
this activity and the relaxation of protocols on fruit handling. Product quality assurance standards,
such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP), and management quality assurance
standards, such as ISO 9000, are tools that the players can integrate into current fruit handling
systems to improve apple quality management throughout the SA fresh apple export value chain.
Most of the apple producers in this study were prepared to pay a levy towards funding research on
key industry issues, such as how to preserve and enhance the quality of apples through the "cold
chain". Finally, packers and exporters need to cooperate more and work together with downstream
firms to overcome harbour terminal bottlenecks. The players could also cooperate more In
identifying and overcoming gaps in staff training and development throughout the chain.
The next chapter discusses how to evaluate and compare investments In the Golden
Delicious, a traditional SA fresh apple export cultivar, and the Pink Lady.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATING POTENTIAL APPLE ORCHARD INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND IRREVERSmaITY
Gala, Braebum, Cameo, Fuji and Pink Lady are expected to be the most popular apple
cultivars for the future (World Apple Report, 2001a). Interviews with key industry players (Dall,
2001; Finn, 2001; Jensen, 2001; Rabe, 2001) at aB levels in the SA fresh apple export value chain
during March 2001 indicate that the need by SA apple producers to more widely adopt these new
apple cultivars was a serious threat to the future competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export value
chain. Table 3.3 also showed that SA fresh apple producers, exporters and packers perceive that the
current mix of fresh apples grown in SA is out of line with international apple consumption trends.
To counteract this threat, it has been suggested that a systematic approach of introducing emerging
apple cultivars into the current SA apple basket is required (Dall, 2001; Rabe, 2001). Chapter 4, and
Chapter 5, evaluate the implications and scope of this strategy to make SA fresh apple exports more
competitive by comparing the expected financial performance of a promising new apple export
cultivar, the Pink Lady, to that of a traditional apple export cultivar, the Golden Delicious in SA.
The next section considers the expected changes in income and costs when a new apple cultivar is
adopted. Section 4.2 then discusses how to evaluate potential apple orchard investments when, due
to uncertainty about yields, prices and apple production costs, and the irreversible nature of such
investments, the option to postpone the investment has value. Section 4.3 concludes the chapter by
describing the data sources and research methodology.
4.1 Expected Changes in Income and Costs When a New Cultivar is Adopted
The success or failure of adopting new apple cultivars to try to create sustainable
competitive advantage can be judged by the extent to which adoption affects the firm's expected
income and costs. The cumulative difference that a new cultivar contributes to a producer's income
over the life-span of an apple orchard will depend on (1) the difference in annual fresh apple yields,
(2) the difference in pack-outs, (3) the relative difference in per carton apple price, and (4) the
comparative growth/decline in demand for each cultivar over time (DaB, 2001). Annual production
costs can also vary from one cultivar to another due to different input (e.g. fertilizer, water, labour,
machinery and chemical) use, and modifications to methods used for pre-harvest and post-harvest
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handling of the fruit. An investment in the new cultivar could also result in SA apple producers
needing to annually purchase cultivar-specific inputs, whose long-term real prices are uncertain
over the orchard's life-span. If the new cultivar requires additional storage facilities and unique
atmospheric controlling devices to improve fruit colouring or to preserve taste, the firm's working
capital requirements would change, causing higher debt servicing charges if capital is borrowed.
Depending on how many additional facilities are needed and the firm's capacity to meet capital
expenditure, the opportunities to convert to a new cultivar may range from nil to extensive.
Producers may also incur relatively high search and information costs when they try to
reduce the uncertainty about how the new cultivar will perform under SA conditions. Information
costs refer to those expenses incurred when sourcing and buying information about new cultivars,
such as details on nutrient, water and annual cold-unit requirements. If there are no applicable
published records, growers may have to conduct their own, potentially expensive, in-field research
and development trials. The administrative burden of collecting, sorting and processing such data
adds to the total information costs as it requires management time, which has an opportunity cost
(Calkins and DiPietre, 1983:115).
The future competitive performance of the SA fresh apple export industry is uncertain due to
potential changes in government labour policy and real interest rates, increased rivalry from other
fresh apple exporting countries like Chile and France, and variability in climatic conditions as
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Poor climatic conditions restrict the growth and colouring of Pink
Lady apples, leading to lower volumes of top quality apples. Postponing a Pink Lady apple orchard
investment will give SA apple producers more time to acquire information about expected Pink
Lady price premiums (currently the price is about 18 per cent higher than that for Golden Delicious
apples), cost and production techniques. The question is whether SA apple producers should invest
in a new Pink Lady apple orchard now, and capitalize on the expected price premium, or wait
another period and only invest if the real Pink Lady apple price remains favourable, and when more
knowledge about how to improve this cultivar's performance is available.
If farmers are typically risk-averse, they would prefer to adopt a farm plan that provides a
satisfactory and more predictable level of income, even if this means sacrificing income on average
(Hazell & Norton, 1986:216). Assuming that the expected income for a risky alternative is higher
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than for a certain outcome, sacrificed income amounts to an opportunity cost such that risk-averse
farmers sacrifice increasingly more income by selecting more certain outcomes. Risk-averse
producers, therefore, will forfeit potentially higher incomes associated with a new cultivar, but non-
adoption shields them from potential losses due to disease, poor cultivar responses to climatic
conditions (such as poor apple colouring), further changes in consumer tastes, and losses incurred
while gaining operating and handling experience for the new cultivar. This means that the rate at
which a new cultivar is adopted also depends on the level of risk-aversion of the chief decision-
makers. To assess whether adopting the Pink Lady apple cultivar can potentially improve the
financial standing of a typical SA fresh apple producer, this section of the study will first tests the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3(a): Fresh apple farmers in SA that grow and export the Pink Lady cultivar are
expected to earn greater net returns on an orchard investment per hectare than if they grow and
export the Golden Delicious cultivar.
The next section describes how orthodox NPV and IRR capital budgeting techniques to
evaluate hypothesis 3(a) must be modified to account for uncertainty and irreversibility.
4.2 Modifying Orthodox Capital Budgeting Methods to Account for the Option to
Postpone an Investment
Recent studies in the US show that the conventional expected NPV and IRR approaches to
capital budgeting that ignore uncertainty and irreversibility are likely to report biased NPV and IRR
estimates, leading to inappropriate investment behaviour (Elmer et al., 2001; Collins and Hanf,
1998; Purvis et a!., 1995; and Dixit and Pindyck, 1995). Biased NPV and IRR estimates are a
consequence of incorrectly assuming that investors face a dichotomous "now" or "never"
investment decision with no possibility to postpone the investment until a later time when more
information might be available. In many cases, however, an investor can delay the project until
later, and by doing so benefit from the opportunity to avoid downside risk if market conditions
become unfavourable. The opportunity to avoid a "wrong" decision implies that the option to
postpone the investment expenditure has value. Incorporating this option value into the orthodox









FIGURE 4.1 The optimal timing of an investment (the value of waiting to invest (curve WIWZ) is equal
to the value of investing immediately (curve ilh». (Source: Purvis et al., 1995).
If, however, an investor values the option to wait to invest, M must be modified and adjusted
upward to reflect the value of the foregone opportunity to postpone the investment. If the present
value of the discounted expected returns then exceeds the modified investment trigger, the
investment is acceptable, as the expected returns cover the full cost (direct cost plus opportunity
cost) of making the investment. The value of waiting (WIW2) is estimated by WK, where the shifter
!
W fixes the position of Wand B determines its slope. The origin of WI W2 is at R = 0 and VCR) = O.
An investor who waits will exercise an option to invest only if VCR) were positive. Gains from
waiting are positively correlated with R because the expected returns are stochastic. The gains from
waiting in the case of apple orchard investments result from being able to avoid downside risk such
as lower real apple prices and adverse climatic conditions. The point where the value of waiting and
the value of investing are tangent corresponds to H on the horizontal axis, and Wequals (H- pKyJ-13
(purvis et a!., 1995). Taking this expression Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 142) derive the modified
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value of the discounted expected returns then exceeds the modified investment trigger, the
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W fixes the position of Wand B determines its slope. The origin of Wl W2 is at R = 0 and V(R) = o.
An investor who waits will exercise an option to invest only if V(R) were positive. Gains from
waiting are positively correlated with R because the expected returns are stochastic. The gains from
waiting in the case of apple orchard investments result from being able to avoid downside risk such
as lower real apple prices and adverse climatic conditions. The point where the value of waiting and
the value of investing are tangent corresponds to H on the horizontal axis, and Wequals (H- pKyJll
(purvis et a!., 1995). Taking this expression Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 142) derive the modified






The H in equation (4.1) is greater than M by the factor B/(B-l) which is the "option value
multiple". At H, the discounted expected returns from investing now are sufficiently high to cover
both K and the opportunity cost of not waiting. The parameter B is a component of the function that
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) derive to calculate the value of waiting, and it is jointly determined by p
and (j2 as
(4.2)
A lower real discount rate, p, and/or greater uncertainty about the expected returns from
investing, (j2, reduces B and increases B/(B-l). This increases the H, implying that the opportunity
cost of exercising the option to invest has risen. A lower real discount rate increases the present
value of later expected net returns and so encourages waiting, while greater uncertainty also
increases the expected gains from waiting.
In addition to the modified H associated with the NPV method, Dixit (1992) proposes using
the modified hurdle rate (P) to evaluate the desirability of making an investment now. The p ,
factors in the value of waiting by raising p (the equivalent of the required rate of return, RRR, in the





where B is again estimated from equation (4.2). Elmer et al. (2001) estimated p' values ranging
from 19 to 29 per cent when they applied real discount rates of between three and nine per cent to
analyze the orchard investment decisions of Texas grapefruit farmers in the US. Purvis et al. (1995)
report p , estimates of two to three times the real discount rate of three per cent that they applied to
evaluate the adoption of dairy housing technology in the US. Summers (1987) found that the
managers of US companies were applying hurdle rates ranging from eight to 30 per cent (with a
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median of 15 per cent and mean of 17 per cent) in their investment decisions when nominal interest
rates were about four per cent. Accounting for uncertainty and irreversibility is likely to make a
difference to SA fresh apple producers that are considering investing in either a new Pink Lady
apple orchard or a new Golden Delicious apple orchard to improve their competitiveness. The
second hypothesis tested in this section of the dissertation, therefore, is as follows:
Hypothesis 3(b): Accounting for uncertainty and irreversibility, SAfresh apple farmers that must
decide now whether to grow and export the new Pink Lady or the traditional Golden Delicious
apple cultivar are expected to apply a higher hurdle rate to the Pink Lady apple orchard investment
(about which they have less information) to trigger expenditure than to the Golden Delicious apple
orchard investment.
The a priori expectation is that SA fresh apple farmers who value the option of waiting for more
information about the future performance of the Pink Lady apple cultivar under SA conditions, will
apply hurdle rates higher than the current real discount rate (P' > p) before deciding to invest in a
Pink Lady apple orchard, and that this hurdle rate will reflect the greater uncertainty associated with
a Pink Lady apple orchard investment compared to that ofa Golden Delicious apple orchard.
4.3 Data Sources and Research Methodology
Equation (4.2) shows that the parameter B is jointly determined by the applied real discount
rate, p, and the variance of the investment's expected annual net returns, (i. The researcher can set a
range of plausible p levels based on previous work such as Elmer et al. (2001) and
recommendations made in financial texts like Barry et al. (1995). Two different approaches can be
used to estimate (l: The ex post approach involves collecting cross-sectional time-series data from
investments similar to the capital investment under consideration, and then deriving dl by averaging
the variance of expected net returns in the observed cases. The implicit assumption is that expected
net returns are homoscedastic, and that past estimates of the variance of expected net returns are the
best measure of future expected variance. However, there is little reason to believe that the variance
of expected annual net returns for apple orchard investments will remain stable over time, especially
given lower real world apple prices, increasing competition from rival fresh apple exporters and the
recent volatility of the Rand exchange rate. The ex post approach is also ineffective when a new
unproven opportunity to invest arises, having no predecessor from which to obtain the necessary
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time-series data. To overcome these constraints, an ex ante approach to the Dixit-Pindyck model for
estimating (l, and hence Hand p', was developed by Purvis et at. (1995), and it is used in this
study.
First, define the natural log difference between the value of the opportunity to invest in an
apple orchard now, Vt , and the potential value of that opportunity one period later, Vr+l' as LllnVj =
In Vr - In Vr+J. The present value of this investment with expected annual net returns of Rt, at time t,
and an instant later, at t + 1, are then defined, respectively, as
and
n ~
PV; = I i
i=O (1 + p)
n+\ R
PV =" t+i
t+\ ~ (1+ py-l .
(4.4)
(4.5)
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 175-212), the present value of the investment can be
converted to the value of the equivalent opportunity to invest in perpetuity as
(4.6)
Similarly, Vt+1 is given by:
(4.7)
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The numerator of equations (4.6) and (4.7) gives the annuity required to generate a stream of
benefits equivalent to the present value of the orchard investment for either of the apple cultivars.
Dividing this annuity by the discount rate, p, converts the stream of benefits to its present value
(purvis, et al., 1995).
The difference between the natural logarithms of VI and Vr+i, or LllnVj, gives a discrete
estimate of the change in the value of an apple orchard investment opportunity, where} is the size of
the sample over which this difference is calculated. Simulated over a large number of iterations, the
expected RI from investing that are used to estimate VI and Vr+l are assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion process, which characteristically provides a discrete approximation of a geometric
Brownian motion variate in the limit (Cox et al., 1979). Thus, the time path of this random process,
with trend Uv and variance clv , is estimated by measuring the movements that occur 10
infinitesimally small, discrete intervals over N iterations. The trend variable, Uv , is estimated by
1 N
Uv ~ -I [d ln~]
N j=1
(4.8)
and then it is applied to estimate the variance of the value of the opportunity to invest, clv, as
(4.9)
where E[(lnVj _ uv)2]» O.
Using equations (4.1) through (4.9) above, the key parameters B, Hand p' were estimated
separately for the Pink Lady apple orchard investment and for the Golden Delicious apple orchard
investment as follows: An MSExcel spreadsheet model was first constructed to proxy the expected
annual net returns per hectare (RI) over the 35-year lifespan of typical Golden Delicious and
expected Pink Lady apple orchards in the Western Cape and Langkloof East regions of SA (Dall,
2001) using real annual net economic profit per hectare (accounting profit less estimated
management costs, and less the opportunity cost of capital). Four apple exporters, two apple
packers and two apple producers, selected from these regions between July 2001 and January 2002,
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provided three-year apple pack-out quality and price data, and apple production cost data for the
two apple cultivars. Variable cost estimates were based on real cost series data that were adjusted to
reflect an orchard bearing 45 tons of apples per hectare per annum (the estimated industry average)
{Dall, 2001). Where possible, data were evaluated for deviations from the DFPT's industrial
averages that were estimated from DFPT apple producing members over the three corresponding
years.
Next, three real discount rates (P's) were used to generate different PVt and PVr+l scenarios
for each apple orchard investment using equations (4.4) and (4.5). Initially, projected real annual
(2000 = 100) incomes and costs were discounted using p equal to five per cent (proxy for the rental
rate of return to land in SA (Nieuwoudt, 1980)) to estimate each investment's PVr and PVr+l. A
comprehensive sensitivity analysis using packer charges that fell/rose by R25 per bin, different
exporter commission rates, different Class I fruit pack-out percentages, and changes in the real
prices of the two cultivars, was also conducted to estimate plausible upper and lower PVt and PVt+1
bounds. Depending on the nature of the services offered, and the type of packing material used,
packer charges range from R89 to R135 per bin, while exporter commission rates currently range
from three to 12 per cent (Dall, 2001). Assuming that the quality specifications for Class I apples
remain the same, the year-on-year Golden Delicious and Pink Lady Class I percentage pack-out can
change by up to seven percentage points and 20 percentage points, respectively (Griessel, 2002).
Lower Class I percentage pack-outs often reflect unfavourable climatic conditions that are beyond
the farmer's control, such as hail, apple yellowing, etc., that lead to poorer quality apples.
Consultants advise Pink Lady apple producers to aim for a Class I apple pack-out above 40 per cent
(a 29 per cent increase on current levels), but most farmers have yet to achieve this level (Dall,
2001). The real price of Golden Delicious apples was allowed to rise/fall by 10 per cent, while the
real price of Pink Lady apples was varied upward by 10 per cent, but downwards by 20 per cent, to
reflect an expected fall in the real prices as supply is expected to rise relative to demand in future as
new orchards start producing. The sensitivity analysis was then repeated using real p's of three, and
seven per cent, as plausible alternative levels ofp that SA fresh apple producers could face. Elrner
et al. (2001) used real p's of three, six, and nine per cent to analyze investments in Texas grapefruit
orchards.
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Thirdly, the plausible upper and lower PVr and PVt+1 bounds generated in the sensitivity
analyses were used in a Monte Carlo simulation model to estimate upper and lower bounds for the
values of the opportunity to invest in perpetuity, Vt and Vt+I, for all three p values as per equations
(4.6) and (4.7). The estimate of the discrete difference, d(lnVj), was simulated using @RISK
software over N = 5000 iterations (Palisade Corporation, 2002) that selected PVt and PVt+1values at
random from the range of values within their upper and lower bounds. Substituting these 5000
d(lnVj) estimates into equations (4.8) and (4.9) produced estimates of U v and clv respectively for
each cultivar. The latter variance statistic values were used to solve equation (4.2) for estimates ofB
at all three p values. Finally, the B estimates were substituted into equations (4.1) and (4.3),
respectively, to estimate the modified investment trigger, H, and the modified hurdle rate, p', for
each p value. Chapter 5 compares pack-out and price data, the annual net returns derived in the




APPLE ORCHARD INVESTMENTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND IRREVERSIBILITY:
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter first compares expected apple pack-outs, real prices and real annual net returns
for the two apple cultivars. It then reports the sensitivity analysis of the expected investment present
values for the two cultivars. The third set of results compares the modified investment triggers and
hurdle rates for the two apple orchard investments.
5.1 Expected Apple Pack-outs, Prices and Annual Net Returns
Table 5.1 shows that between 1999 and 2001, SA fresh apple producers were paid, on
average, R493 per ton (R6.16 per carton) more for Class I Pink Lady apples than for Class I Golden
Delicious apples. Weighted according to pack-out, the average Pink Lady price per ton was 17.8 per
cent higher, despite a greater percentage of Class I Golden Delicious fruit per ton.
Table 5.1. Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apple quality distribution and average real
prices (2000=100), Western Cape and Langkloof East regions of South Africa,
1999-2001.








































Note: aprices reflect producer average prices per ton (CIF value less packer service charges, exporter commissions,
freight, sea insurance, loadings and port costs). !>Packer service charges, exporter commissions, freight, sea insurance,
loadings and port costs are not incurred for processed apples.
The relatively higher Golden Delicious Class I pack-out suggests that this cultivar is
currently more suited to climatic conditions in SA, and also reflects the experience accumulated by
managers and farm staff in producing and handling this cultivar. The higher Pink Lady weighted
average income per bin is partly due to a higher share of Class IT fruit (36 per cent of output) that
was sold at R66 per ton more than Golden Delicious apples. Cartons of Class IT apples are either
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sold in domestic municipal markets or are exported. A key question is for how long will the current
price premium for Pink Lady apples continue before falling over time as Pink Lady apple supply
increases with new plantings, or as current Pink Lady orchards mature? Class ill apples are mostly
used in EconoPaks sold by SA retail chain stores, or purchased by hawkers for informal markets.
Consistent with the industry average, between 15 and 20 per cent of production for both cultivars
was sent for processing for a price ofR403 per ton.
The Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apples are expected to have similar yields per hectare
over 35 years in the main growing areas of the Western Cape and Langkloof East (Dall, 2001;
Campbell, 2002; CIAMD, 2001). Estimated yields should typically rise to about 55-60 tons per
hectare in year eight and then fall gradually to about 33 tons per hectare by year 35. Based on these
expected yield levels, Table 5.2 on page 48 shows the expected real annual income and real costs
per hectare of Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apples in years 0, 10 and 35 after orchards
establishment.
The higher expected gross income after service fees for the Pink Lady cultivar reflects its
pnce premium compared to the Golden Delicious cultivar, despite slightly higher storage,
commission, marketing and freight costs. Pink Lady orchard establishment costs (K in equation
(4.1)) are nearly RIO 000 higher at recommended tree planting densities per hectare, mainly due to
the once-off royalty charges ofR6 per tree, which raise operating costs for Pink Lady by R7.78 per
ton. Based on the three-year series data, Pink Lady operating charges were on average R56 per ton
higher than for Golden Delicious due to higher expected harvesting and spraying costs. Multiple
picking is required for Pink Lady orchards and adds about R 39.67 per ton to operating costs - and
there are two extra applications of chemical sprays as Pink Lady apples remain on the tree for
longer. Given the period that apples remain in cold storage, the estimated average per ton price after
service fees were deducted, and the estimated average real SA R150 bond market yield4 of 4.12 per
cent (South African Reserve Bank, 2002), the expected annual opportunity cost of keeping apples in
cold storage was estimated at R14.76 per ton for Pink Lady, and R1l.23 per ton for Golden
Delicious apples. A fixed annual management fee of five per cent of gross income (Calkins and
DiPietre, 1983:115) derived from an average annual yield of 45 tons per hectare for both cultivars
4 Average real R150 bond yields = [((1+ i)/(l+CPIX))-l] (adapted from Kay and Edwards (1999)), where i = monthly
average R150 bond yields, and CPIX = monthly adjusted conSlUller price index excluding interest and mortgage bonds,
from January 2001 to January 2002.
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was also included as a proxy for the opportunity cost of management time. The higher annual fee
for the Pink Lady orchard (R3 417 versus R2 578) reflects more management time spent
supervising multiple pickings and extra spray applications.
Overall, the Pink Lady generates relatively more expected net economic profit per hectare of
established orchard (over 50 per cent by year 10) - its higher income offsets higher expected costs
per hectare. At a p of five per cent, the estimated orthodox NPV per hectare for the Pink Lady and
Golden Delicious apple orchard investments was R14 030 and R12 276, respectively. The
corresponding estimated orthodox IRR was 10.24 per cent and 5.67 per cent, respectively. Based on
orthodox capital budgeting methods to evaluate potential Pink Lady and Golden Delicious apple
orchard investments, these results suggest that the Pink Lady apple orchard investment would be the
relatively more profitable venture. These results support to hypothesis 3(a) on page 36 of the
dissertation.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Expected Investment Present Values
Assuming in the case of the Pink Lady apple orchard investment, a 31 per cent Class I and
36 per cent Class IT quality distribution, a seven-and-a-half per cent exporter commission, a R120
per bin packing charge, a 120-day storage period for apples in controlled atmosphere storage, and a
real apple price ranging from R2 436 per ton for Class I apples to R403 per ton for processed
apples, the estimated PVt for a Pink Lady apple orchard when p = five per cent was R205 000 per
hectare. Using sensitivity analysis to vary these key parameters by plausible amounts - for example,
Class I pack-out ranges from 25 per cent to 45 per cent, and 10 per cent increases and 20 per cent
decreases in the real apple price range - a triangular distribution was estimated for PVt with
minimum and maximum values of R120 000 and R290 000 per hectare, respectively. Figure 5.1 on
page 49 shows the distribution of PT7t per hectare values for a Pink Lady apple orchard investment
in SA generated by the Monte Carlo simulation. This procedure was repeated for the Pink Lady
investment at p values of three per cent and seven per cent, and for the Golden Delicious investment
at p values of three, five and seven per cent.
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Table 5.2. Estimated real income and real costs per hectare for Golden Delicious and Pink
Lady apples in South Africa for years 0, 10 and 35 after orchard establishment
(2000=100).
CuItivar Golden Delicious Pink Lady
0 10 35 0 10 35Year
Projected Yields (tons per Ha) 0 61 33 0 61 33
Gross Income Before Service Fees 0 125310 67791 0 142221 76939
Packer Costs 0 15831 8564 0 15831 8564
Packer Storage Charges 0 8326 4504 0 9297 5030
Exporter Commission 0 8767 4743 0 10129 5480
Domestic Marketing 0 2292 1240 0 1528 826
Freight 0 11520 6232 0 12864 6959
Gross Income After Service Fees (1) 0 78574 42508 0 92572 50080
Operating Costs
Harvesting 0 6471 3501 0 8952 4843
Fuel, Oil and Lubricants 2105 6572 3555 2105 6572 3555
Planting 39829 0 0 39829 0 0
Fertilizer 3646 2414 1306 3646 2414 1306
Weed Control 128 500 500 128 500 500
Orchard Maintenance 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252 3252
Irrigation 9000 500 500 9000 500 500
Chemical Sprays 306 7907 4278 310 8157 4413
Salaries & Wages 9448 11558 10494 9448 11558 10494
Depreciation 8434 8434 8434 8434 8434 8434
Other 11161 6695 4632 11161 6695 4632
Levies 0 816 441 0 816 441
Royalties 0 0 0 10000 0 0
Total Operating Costs 87309 55119 40893 97313 57850 42370
Opportunity Cost
Apples Kept in Cold Storage 0 685 371 0 918 496
Management Fee 2578 2578 2578 3417 3417 3417
Total Opportunity Cost 2578 3263 2949 3417 4335 3913
Total Activity Cost (2) 89887 58382 43842 100730 62185 46283
Net Economic Profit (3) =(1) - (2) -89887 20192 -1334 -100730 30387 3797
Note: These figures are weIghted estunates based on plaUSIble pack-outs for the four qualIty classes over the years
1999-200 I. Packing service charges were R120 per bin (R320 per ton), and packer storage facilities were estimated at
R136.89 and R150.14 per ton for Golden Delicious and Pink Lady, respectively (R5 per bin per week multiplied by the
average number of weeks (17) that apples spent in cold storage during 2001 multiplied by the proportion of apples in
cold storage). Exporter costs were calculated at 7.5 per cent of the average international selling price for each cultivar.
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FIGURE 5.1 Distribution of the present value of expected annual net returns per hectare generated
by Monte Carlo simulation for a Pink Lady apple orchard investment in the Western
Cape and Langkloof East regions, 200t.
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Table 5.3 summanzes the result of these sensitivity analyses. The corresponding PVt
estimates, as expected, had slightly lower values than the PVr estimates (and PVr+l) are higher and
have a larger range than the Golden Delicious estimates - the investment with higher expected
annual returns seems to have higher inherent business risk.
Table 5.3. Plausible lower, most likely and upper PV parameters for Golden Delicious and
































5.3 Modified Investment Triggers and Hurdle Rates
Using the PVr and PVt+1 ranges and the @RISK simulation models to estimate equations
(4.4) through (4.9), and equation (4.2), for both the Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apple orchard
investments, the estimated option value multiple, B/(B-J), was 1.89 and 2.28 for p = five per cent,
respectively. Orthodox NPV analysis of the Pink Lady orchard investment would estimate a
Marshallian investment trigger, M = pK, at R5 037 per hectare (0.05 x RlOO 730). Substituting 2.28
for B/(B-J), and R5 037 for M in equation (4.1), implies a modified investment trigger, H, ofR12
994 per hectare in the first scenario where p = five per cent. Substituting 2.28 for B/(B-l), and p =
five per cent into equation (4.3) gives an estimated modified hurdle rate for the Pink Lady apple
orchard investment, p 'PL, of 11.41 per cent. These results imply that SA apple producers that value
the option to postpone a Pink Lady apple orchard investment in the Western Cape and Langkloof
East regions of SA must have an expected real IRR greater than 11.41 per cent, or equivalently,
have an expected present value of real annual net returns above R12 994 per hectare, to trigger
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investment expenditure. Similarly, potential Golden Delicious apple orchard investments in the
Western Cape and LangkloofEast regions of SA must have an expected real RRR greater than 9.45
per cent, or have an expected present value of real annual net returns above R8 493 per hectare, to
trigger investment expenditure. These results and the modified H and p' hurdle rates for the other
two scenarios where p = three per cent and seven per cent, respectively, are summarized in Table
5.4. Since the Pink Lady apple orchard investment has a higher modified hurdle rate than the
Golden Delicious apple orchard investment at all levels of p, the results imply SA fresh apple
farmers who value the option to invest in either cultivar require a higher expected rate of return for
the Pink Lady apple orchard investment to initiate investment now. The results support hypothesis
3(b) in section 4.2. For all values ofp, the estimated H and p' are between one and two-thirds to
nearly three times higher than M and p, which is consistent with the US studies by Summers (1987),
Elmer et al. (2001), and Purvis et al. (1995) cited above.
Table 5.4 Estimated modified real hurdle rates and optimal investment triggers per hectare
for Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apple orchard investments in the Western
Cape and LangkloofEast, 2001.
Real Discount Rate
p=3 % p=5 % p=7 %
Apple Cultivar, Investment Triggers and Hurdle Rates
Golden Delicious
Option value multiple, B/(B-l)
Marshallian investment trigger, M
Optimal investment trigger, H
Modified hurdle rate, p'GD
Pink Lady
Option value multiple, B/(B-l)
Marshallian investment trigger, M
Optimal investment trigger, H


























The growing and marketing of inappropriate apple cultivars has been identified by
producers, packers and exporters of fresh apples, and by apple industry experts, in SA as a serious
threat to the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export value chain. Fresh apple producers in SA
that want to adopt new apple cultivars to improve their competitiveness must compare the expected
gains and additional costs, including the risk of making a wrong investment decision. Gains from
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investing will depend on current and future apple demand, yields, quality and real prices, while
additional costs include higher search and information costs, greater input use, and the foregone
option to delay investing (option value). The results show that if the option to postpone an
investment in a Pink Lady or Golden Delicious apple orchard investment is ignored, the Pink Lady
investment is relatively more profitable due to the higher orthodox IRR (10.24 per cent> 5.67 per
cent). However, the ex ante version of the Dixit-Pindyck investment model - that accounts for
uncertainty and irreversibility - used in this study suggests that a Pink Lady orchard investment has
a higher modified investment trigger, and a higher modified hurdle rate that must be exceeded to
initiate investment. This result is plausible, as the Pink Lady investment has higher expected net
returns over its life span, but also greater variance of the expected annual net returns. Assuming a
five per cent real discount rate, the Pink Lady apple orchard investment in SA should yield an
expected modified net present value, H, of at least R12 994 per hectare and a modified real RRR,
P'PL, greater than 11.41 per cent to trigger investment expenditure. For a Golden Delicious orchard
investment, the H and P'GD values were estimated at R8 493 per hectare and 9.45 per cent,
respectively. Decision-makers that apply lower real discount rates and that are more uncertain about
future annual net returns from a new apple orchard investment will have relatively higher hurdle
rates to justify investing now.
Since about 58 per cent of SA apple farm-level gross income is derived from sales of apples
for export, the volatile performance of the Rand against the US Dollar, the British Pound and the
Euro, has caused major variability in SA fresh apple farm profits. Furthermore, export freight, fuel,
chemical sprays and other specialized input costs shift with changes in the value of the US Dollar,
which adds to the complexity of forecasting the future net returns from an apple orchard investment.
In the short-term, managers can try to reduce the impact of unfavourable exchange rate changes by
exploring the use of forward exchange rate contracts, freight forwarding, or minimum price
contracts with packers, exporters and import receivers.
Investors with less capital resources - due to lower real world apple prices, drought, the
withdrawal of government export incentives, high real interest rates, and increased competition
from other exporting rivals (Hardman et al., 2002) - have less scope to adopt new apple cultivars.
These players should focus on lowering production and operating costs; for example, finding lower-
cost specialized production inputs (such as new chemical sprays to prevent disease or to improve
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fruit ripening), trying to reduce apple transport costs through bulk product shipments, or improving
orchard yields through better orchard maintenance programmes. In the long-run, however, retail
consolidation trends are likely to continue or intensify, meaning that all players in the SA fresh
apple export value chain will need to more closely track changing consumer needs, and respond by
adjusting their production patterns.
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CONCLUSION
The relational view of competitive advantage contends that players in a value chain must
consider appropriate ways to link their firm's human resources with those of up- and downstream
partners to create competitive advantage for mutual benefit. This study first developed a standard
causal model showing how higher levels of trust lead to greater cooperation (joint problem-solving
and communication) between value chain players, and how greater cooperation, in turn, encourages
them to commit more human resources to value chain activities. The study then extends this model
and contributes to theory with the hypothesis that identifying and communicating key constraints on
value chain competitiveness can help the players to build trust and improve cooperation as they
know where to focus resources to try jointly overcome these constraints. The extended model is
then adapted to identify how to improve cooperation to make the SA fresh apple export value chain
more competitive. The management implication of the extended model for any value chain is that
over time, the players must learn more about the external and internal environments in which the
chain operates, each other's business, and the key sources of risk associated with their investments.
They are then likely to be more committed to reevaluate their linkages and work together to
overcome the constraints and implement necessary changes to make the value chain perform better.
In the SA fresh apple export value chain, higher levels of trust led to more joint problem-
solving between producers and packers, and to more communication between producers and
exporters. More joint problem-solving between producers and packers encouraged producers to
commit greater levels of human resources to the working relationship. At the producer-exporter
link, higher levels of both communication and joint problem-solving led to higher human resource
commitment by producers to the relationship. Following deregulation of SA apple marketing after
1996 and the relaxation of pre-harvest and post-harvest apple handling protocols, these players
could cooperate more closely on delivery scheduling and quality control to promote the
competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export value chain. Furthermore, these efforts can be assisted
if the players communicate more about what are, and how to overcome, the perceived key
constraints that limit competitiveness in a market characterized by falling real prices for apple
exports.
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The empirical survey of the perceptions of SA apple producers, packers and exporters
operating in the Western Cape and Langkloof East regions of SA identifies climatic conditions, no
government export incentives, increased competition from rival apple-exporting countries,
restrictive government labour policy, high interest rates, the production and marketing of
inappropriate apple cultivars, harbour terminal bottlenecks and lack of training and human
development as key constraints that limit competitiveness. Dry winters in the late 1990's, which
resulted in lower apple pack-outs and declines in average apple export earnings of 11 and 22 per
cent in 1999 and 2000, respectively, focused attention on the SA fresh apple export value chain's
vulnerability to supply shocks and the difficulties to coping with drought conditions in the short-
term. Research institutions, such as universities and Hortec (Pty) Ltd (a subsidiary of the DFPT) can
help to collect, analyze and disseminate regional information on the current performance of
different apple cultivars so that apple producers can adjust their production plans to include
cultivars that are more drought resistant. The DFPT can also play a key role in assisting producers
to make better apple orchard investment decisions by providing key industrial statistics and
technical help. Patrick et al. (1985), Woodburn et al. (1995) and Wermund and Fearne (2000) also
indicated yield (weather) variability as a major source of risk for US, SA and British crop farmers,
respectively. By adopting management and product quality assurance standards, such as Nature's
Choice, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) and ISO 9000, managers can improve
the consistency of their quality pack-outs. These systems also encourage the capture and monitoring
of key production information, such as yields per hectare and the percentage pack-out of Class I
fruit, that can be used to estimate more accurately the expected variability in annual net returns.
Adopting drought tolerant apple cultivars could reduce the threat posed by poor climatic conditions
in dry years and play a role in helping SA fresh apple growers to manage orchard yields and pack-
outs over time.
No government export incentives, restrictive government labour policy and high interest
rates were the main constraints perceived by the sample of SA fresh apple producers. Although the
DFPT is mandated by its members to raise these issues at local and national government level, it is
unlikely that government will reintroduce export incentives and compromise efforts to promote
SA's integration into the world economy through the World Trade Organization, or provide
subsidies on interest rates to existing apple producers. SA fresh apple exporters are more concerned
about the impact of increased competition from rival apple exporting countries (e.g. Chile and
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France), harbour terminal bottlenecks and the lack of training and human capital development than
are apple producers and packers. The PPECB could advise stakeholders about aspects of apple
handling methods to include in staff training programmes, or perhaps in on-farm workshops, that
could improve the SA fresh apple export value chain's performance by reducing the cases of
rejected SA apple consignments in foreign ports that occur due to human error. Further research
would be required to investigate how players at all levels of the SA fresh apple export value chain,
the DFPT, and government should cooperate and jointly create, implement and monitor appropriate
strategies to develop skills in the SA fresh apple export value chain, and how these training projects
should be financed.
The SA apple packers in the sample ranked the growing and marketing of inappropriate
apple cultivars more highly as a constraint on the chain's competitiveness than did sample apple
exporters or producers, although all respondents acknowledge that a better mix of apple cultivars
grown in SA would make the SA fresh apple export value chain more competitive in global fresh
apple markets. These findings concur with the views expressed by SA apple industry experts during
personal interviews in 2001, that SA apple producers need to become more responsive to
international apple consumer trends, and grow apple cultivars like Gala, Red Delicious, Braeburn
and the Pink Lady.
Regarding investment appraisal, this study has highlighted the need for modified NPV and
IRR analyses that explicitly account for uncertainty and irreversibility when assessing the potential
profitability of new apple orchard investments. Uncertainty about the future annual net returns from
a new apple orchard, and the irreversible nature of such investment, mean that investors may
postpone capital expenditure, or seek higher returns to compensate them for uncertainty and
irreversibility. For investors who account for uncertainty and irreversibility, the option to postpone
an investment has value, and adds to the costs that must be hurdled in order to justify investing now
rather than waiting. The value of waiting to invest is the result of an opportunity to avoid downside
risk, and is estimated from two parameters - the real discount rate, p, and the variance of expected
real annual net returns, cl. Decision-makers that apply lower real discount rates and that are more
uncertain about future annual net returns from a new apple orchard investment will have relatively
higher hurdle rates to justify investing now.
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Study results show that if SA fresh apple producers who apply the orthodox rate, p, of five
per cent, account for uncertainty and irreversibility, they should only invest in a Pink Lady apple
orchard if the expected annual real rate-of-retum is greater than 11.41 per cent - more than double
the orthodox rate, and when the value of the investment opportunity exceeds R12 994 per hectare.
For a Golden Delicious apple orchard investment the expected annual real rate-of-return and the
value of the investment opportunity for these producers must be greater than 9.45 per cent and
R8493 per hectare, respectively, to trigger capital expenditure. This result is plausible, as the Pink
Lady orchard investment has higher expected annual net returns over its lifespan, but also greater
variance of the expected annual net returns than the Golden Delicious orchard investment.
Differences of this level between orthodox and modified hurdle rates have also been reported in




Fresh apple growers, packers and exporters in the South African (SA) fresh apple export
value chain must implement appropriate strategies that will help to improve competitiveness given
declining real world apple prices (about 25 per cent since 1991), intensifying rivalry between fresh
apple exporting countries like Chile and France, and global retail consolidation that shifts market
power in fresh fruit value chains towards retailers, category managers, and import receivers.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation discusses key drivers of change in the SA fresh apple export value
chain, recent international and local studies of the comparative performance of the SA fresh apple
export value chain relative to its rivals, and the players currently operating in the SA fresh apple
industry. Using the first empirical survey of the perceptions of SA fresh apple producers, packers
and exporters in the Western Cape and LangkloofEast region conducted during 2001, this study
investigates aspects of cooperation between these players in order to show where they need to
commit more resources to make the SA fresh apple export value chain more competitive. The
relational view of competitive advantage describes cooperation as the processes by which firms
develop mechanisms to come together, interact and form relationships that are expected to benefit
both partners by improving aspects of their business such as the rate of learning and innovation,
lowering transaction costs, and achieving more effective coordination. Thus, managers can expect
to sustain competitive advantage created by lower cost/differentiation competitive strategies by
cooperating across firms to build alliances and leverage resources.
A conceptual model of cooperative behaviour among the players in a value chain is outlined
in Chapter 2 as a basis for developing research hypotheses that are then applied to the case of the
SA fresh apple export value chain. This model draws on work conducted in the United States,
Australia, Europe and SA, to highlight the role of trust in promoting cooperative behaviour - like
joint problem-solving and communication - and how such behaviour encourages the players to
commit more human resources to chain activities. The model is then extended to consider how
monitoring changes internal and external to the value chain, and evaluating the risks associated with
chain specific investments, can help to build trust and implement cooperation by identifying the key
constraints on chain competitiveness that the players need to manage over time.
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The target population of 522 apple producers, 37 apple packers and 14 apple exporters in the
Western Cape and Langkloof East region were sent questionnaires by post or e-mail in April and
May 2001, or personally interviewed during July 2001, to obtain information about (1) the degree of
trust, joint problem-solving, communication, and human resources commitment between them in
the SA fresh apple export value chain, (2) their levels of cooperation in production planning, harvest
scheduling, apple marketing and quality control, and (3) the factors that they perceive constrain the
industry from becoming more competitive internationally. The player's perceptions of the level of
these factors in their working relationships with value chain partners were estimated using an index
derived from their scores on Likert-type scales that showed how strongly the players agreed or
disagreed with statements pertaining to aspects of trust, communication, joint problem-solving and
commitment.
The empirical results obtained using a recursive Ordinary Least Squares model show that
higher levels of trust lead to more cooperation (joint problem-solving and communication) between
these players. Higher levels of joint problem-solving and communication, in turn, encouraged
producers to commit more human resources to working with packers and exporters to find ways of
making the chain more competitive. Results also suggest that the players need to particularly
improve cooperation in production planning, delivery scheduling and quality control.
Packers and exporters ranked climatic conditions as the top constraint currently facing the
SA fresh apple industry, probably reflecting their concerns over the annual "pack-out" (quality
distribution) of the apple crop. No government export incentives, increased competition from rival
apple-exporting countries, restrictive government labour policy, high interest rates, production and
marketing of inappropriate apple cultivars, harbour terminal bottlenecks and lack of training and
human development are also major concerns among the players, although fresh apple producers
rank macroeconomic factors (no government export incentives, restrictive government labour policy
and high interest rates) relatively higher. SA fresh apple exporters identified the threat of increased
competition from rival apple exporting countries, the impact of harbour terminal bottlenecks and the
lack of training and human capital development as areas where more attention from all players is
required. Packers ranked the growing and marketing of inappropriate apple cultivars as a constraint
higher than did apple exporters and producers, although all respondents acknowledge that a better
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mix of apple cultivars could probably improve the competitiveness of the SA fresh apple export
value chain in global fresh apple markets.
The Pink Lady apple cultivar was identified as the most popular of the new apple cultivars
grown in SA according to North American and European retailers. This study, therefore, compares
the potential profitability of a Pink Lady apple orchard relative to the potential profitability of an
orchard investment in a traditional SA fresh apple export cultivar - the Golden Delicious. The
expected Net Present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate-of-Return (IRR) approaches to capital
budgeting are commonly used to assess the desirability of such investment alternatives, where the
decision rules are to accept the investment with the greatest positive NPV and IRR. These orthodox
NPV and IRR evaluations, however, assume that investors face a dichotomous "now" or "never"
decision with no possibility to postpone the investment until a later time when more information
might be available. In most cases investment expenditure can be delayed, and the possibility to
benefit from "hindsight" can profoundly affect ifand when a manager might make the investment,
especially when expected net returns from the investment are uncertain. A "wrong" or a regrettable
choice is usually costly since apple orchard investment expenditures are partially or completely
irreversible (the start-up investment costs are sunk costs once the investment expenditure occurs,
and cannot be fully recovered in the short-term).
To account for uncertainty and irreversibility, this study uses an ex ante version of the Dixit-
Pindyck investment model to assess the viability of these alternative apple orchard investments.
This investment model essentially raises the orthodox hurdle rate that must be met to justify
investing now by an amount that reflects the value of the option to postpone the investment. An
MSExcel spreadsheet model was constructed to proxy the expected annual net returns per hectare
over the 35-year lifespan of typical Golden Delicious and Pink Lady apple orchards in the Western
Cape and Langkloof East regions of SA using real annual net economic profit per hectare
(accounting profit less estimated management costs, and less the opportunity cost of capital). Four
apple exporters, two apple packers and two apple producers, selected from these regions between
July 2001 and January 2002, provided three-year apple pack-out quality and price data, and apple
production cost data for the two apple cultivars. Next, real discount rates of three, five and seven
per cent were used to generate different estimates of the present value of the investment opportunity
in the current period (PVr) and one period later (PVt+I). A comprehensive sensitivity analysis using
61
different Class I fruit pack-out percentages, different exporter commission rates, changes in the real
prices of the two cultivars, and packer charges that fell/rose by R25 per bin, was also conducted to
estimate plausible upper and lower PVt and PVr+l bounds. Thirdly, the plausible upper and lower
PVr and PVt+ 1 bounds generated in the sensitivity analyses were used in a Monte Carlo simulation
model to estimate upper and lower bounds for the values of the opportunity to invest in perpetuity,
VI and Vr+l , for each real discount value, simulated using @RISK software over 5000 iterations.
Finally, the modified hurdle rates are estimated by adjusting the orthodox real discount rates by an
option value multiple derived from the mean and variance values of the discrete log-difference
between Vr and Vt+l over the 5000 iterations.
Typical Pink Lady apple orchards in the Western Cape and Langkloof East areas have
higher orchard establishment, crop harvesting and crop spraying costs than do Golden Delicious
apple orchards, but retailers currently pay R493 per ton (25.3 per cent) more, on average, for Pink
Lady apples. Results show that a potential Pink Lady orchard investment is relatively more
profitable than a potential Golden Delicious orchard investment. In addition, for SA apple producers
accounting for uncertainty, and who value the option to postpone an apple orchard investment
decision, a Pink Lady apple orchard investment in SA needs to yield an expected value of at least
R12 994 per hectare and a rate-of-return greater than 11.41 per cent (assuming a real discount rate
of five per cent) to trigger investment expenditure, compared to a Golden Delicious orchard
investment opportunity where the Hand p' statistics were estimated at R8 493 per hectare and 9.45
per cent, respectively. This result is plausible, as the Pink Lady investment has higher expected net
returns over its life span, but also greater variance of the expected net returns. These modified
hurdle rates are about two times the orthodox rate of five per cent that is commonly used in capital
budgeting analyses. Such differences between orthodox and modified hurdle rates have also been
reported in recent studies on the adoption of dairy technology and grapefruit orchard investments in
the United States.
Judging by the players' perceptions that climatic conditions prevent the SA fresh apple
export value chain from becoming more competitive, and recent studies that identify yield (weather)
variability as a major source of risk for US, SA and British crop farmers, climate-related export
supply shocks are an important source of uncertainty in making decisions to invest in new apple
orchards. Fresh apple producers in SA should, therefore, explore ways to reduce the uncertainty of
62
expected annual net returns from investing in new cultivars like the Pink Lady. For example, by
adopting management and product quality assurance standards, such as Nature's Choice, Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) and ISO 9000, managers can improve the consistency
of their quality pack-outs. These systems also encourage the capturing and monitoring of key
production information, such as yields per hectare and the percentage pack-out of Class I fruit, that
can be used to more accurately estimate how expected annual net returns may vary with changes in
climatic conditions. Subsequently, adopting drought tolerant apple cultivars could reduce the threat
posed by poor climatic conditions in dry years and play a role in helping SA fresh apple growers to
manage apple orchard yields and pack-outs.
Since about 58 per cent of SA apple farm-level gross income is derived from sales of apples
for export, the volatile performance of the Rand against the US Dollar, the British Pound and the
Euro, has caused major variability in SA fresh apple farm profits. Furthermore, export freight, fuel,
chemical spray and other specialized input costs shift with changes in the value of the US Dollar,
which adds to the complexity of forecasting the future net returns from an apple orchard investment.
In the short-term, managers can try to reduce the impact of unfavourable exchange rate changes by
exploring the use of forward exchange rate contracts, freight forwarding, or minimum price
contracts with packers, exporters and import receivers.
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1 China 24,007 20,437
2 United States of America 4,850 4,830
3 Turkev 2,500 2,500
4 Poland 2,224 1,450
5 Italy 2,156 2,156
6 France 2,150 2,157
7 Iran, Islamic Rep of 1,900 2,000
8 Argentina 1,565 833
9 Germany 1,490 2,631
10 India 1,380 1,380
11 Russian Federation 1,300 1,200
12 Brazil 1,150 1,160
13 Chile 1,075 909
14 Spain .. 932 755
15 Japan 800 800
16 Ukraine 750 648
17 Hungary 700 695
18 Korea, Dem People's Rep 650 650
19 Pakistan 577 577
20 Netherlands 575 575
21 South Africa 565 565
22 Mexico 550 519
23 Canada 532 532
24 Belgium-Luxembourg 500 497









1 France 718 766
2 United States of America 639 582
3 Italy 569 540
4 Chile 522 576
5 Netherlands 434 339
6 Belgium-Luxembourg 409 335
7 New Zealand 362 292
8 South Africa 251 274
9 China 219 170
10 Argentina 182 228
11 Iran, Islamic Rep of 158 176
12 Poland 149 169
13 Germany 69 52
14 Canada 68 65
15 Brazil 57 11
16 Spain 54 58
17 Czech Republic 53 64
18 Austria 40 34
19 Macedonia,The Fmr Yug Rp 40 40









1 Germany 725 708
2 United Kingdom 449 460
3 Nether1ands 339 236
4 BelQium-LuxembourQ 233 248
5 Spain 213 133
6 United States of America 164 142
7 China 164 159
8 Russian Federation 162 359
9 Mexico 136 84
10 Canada 121 115
11 Austria 117 62
12 France 101 88
13 China, Hong Kong SAR 94 92
14 Sweden 87 87
15 Saudi Arabia 86 126
16 United Arab Emirates 79 50
17 Portugal 77 65
18 Philippines 74 48
19 Denmark 74 43




Appendix 2: Competitive rankings of major world apple producers, 2001
Overall
Production Infrastructure Financial &
Rank Efficiency & Inputs Markets
1 N. Zealand Austria Chile N. Zealand
2 Chile Netherlands US. Netherlands
3 Netherlands N. Zealand Argentina Belgium
4 Austria Brazil N. Zealand France
5 France South Africa Canada Chile
6 US. Chile France Japan
7 Belgium Belgium South Africa US.
8 Australia France Australia Australia
9 South Africa Germany Italy Italy
10 Japan Australia Turkey UK.
11 Argentina· Poland Brazil Canada
12 Italy Italy Austria Austria
13 Canada Japan Belgium Germany
14 Germany US. Japan Argentina
15 Brazil Turkey Germany Spain
16 UK. Yugoslavia Netherlands South. Africa
17 Spain Canada UK. Brazil
18 Turkey Argentina Spain Greece
19 Greece Russian Fed. Greece China
20 Poland China Mexico Hungary
21 China Greece Poland Poland
22 Hungary Hungary Hungary Mexico
23 Mexico Spain China Turkey
24 Yugoslavia Bulgaria Yugoslavia Bulgaria
25 Bulgaria UK. Bulgaria Russian Fed.
26 Russian Fed. Mexico Russian Fed. Yugoslavia
27 Romania Romania Romania Romania
(Source: World Apple Report, 2001)
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Appendix 3: Apple producer questionnaire: 2001
University of Natal
School of Agricultural Sciences and Agribusiness
Discipline of Agricultural Economics
APPLE PRODUCER QUESTIONNAIRE: 2001
To be completed by the principal decision-maker of the farm business.
The main objective of this questionnaire is to investigate how players at different levels in the apple
export industry perform in order to identify factors that could improve overall competitiveness. If
your firm packs your own apples, please ignore section B but complete section D. YOUR
SURVEY ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
SECTION A: FIRM DETAILS
1. What form of business do you operate (please mark the appropriate block)?
Form X










Apples (tons) I I
3. Is the firm active in other production enterprises besides apple production (please mark the

















4. From your balance sheet and income statement please complete the following table.





Interest on all Debt
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5. From your income statements or profit and loss accounts for the last three financial years,
indicate total expenditure for the following cost categories.















Transportation (+ fuel + oil)
6. Please rate your management ability (relative to other producers in your district) in the
following areas of management (please mark the relevant block, where 1 = poor manager and
5 =excellent manager).
Area of management Management ability
Poor Excellent






7. In your opinion, what are the major obstacles hindering the SA apple export industry from
becoming more competitive? Rate the following aspects on a scale of 1 (minor hindrance)
to 5 (major hindrance) and add any further factors that you view as important.
Source ofHindrance Value of feature
Minor Major
Hindrance Hindrance
1 2 3 4 5
A Crime
B Production and marketing of inappropriate
apple cultivars
C Lack of foreign investment into SA
D Ageing apple exporting infrastructure
E Lack ofmarket information
F No government export incentives
G Restrictive government labour policy
H Increased competition from Southern
Hemisphere countries
I Climatic conditions
J High Interest rates
K Abandoning offruit handling protocols
through supply chain.
L Over-capitalization at packhouses
M Lack of training and human deVelopment
N Harbour terminal bottlenecks
0 Exporter liquidity problems
P Exporter inexperience in international trade
Q Current levels of investment in research and
development (R & D) ofapple cultivars
R Other: Please specify:
S Other: Please specify:
The next section deals with your relationship with your fruit packer. This section can be
ignored ifyou packyour own apples.
SECTION B: PRODUCERlPACKER RELATIONSHIP
1. Please name the packer that you have used in the last 12 months: _
2. When did you begin to use your current fruit packer? (Month/ Year) / _
3. How would you describe the level of cooperation between you and your packer in the
following business activities (please mark the appropriate block)?
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4. Have you been involved in any joint development projects with this packer over the last
year? (Yes/No) _
5. IfYes, describe: '
6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your
relationship with your packer (please mark the appropriate block).
83
Statement Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
A2ree Disa2ree
A We devote considerable time trying to improve
this relationship
B We devote considerable time trying to improve
the packer's productivity
C We have made a substantial number of
adaptations in our delivery schedule in order to
deal more effectively with this packer
D We often discuss issues such as changes in
technology and market conditions
E We have extensive formal and informal
communications
F We discuss only need-to-know information that
relates directly to our relationship
G We make ioint decisions about:
G.! Reducing costs in the packhouse
G.2 Delivery scheduling
G.3 Quality control
H In this relationship, both sides work together to
achieve productivity gains from which both
sides benefit
I We have a strong personal confidence in each
other
J We have a strong business confidence in each
other
K We can always rely on each other when it
counts
L I believe this packer will work hard in the future
to maintain a close relationship with my firm
M I am very confident that this relationship will
continue in the future
7. Do you plan to renegotiate and renew your contract with the packer for the forthcoming
season? (Yes/No) _
8. IfNo, give reasons: _
The next section deals with your relationship with your/roit exporter.
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SECTION C: PRODUCERJEXPORTER RELATIONSHIP
1. When did you start supplying this exporter? (Month! Year) /__
2. Please indicate which exporter from the list below you have used most, if any. (please mark
appropriate block). If you have used more than one exporter, indicate the percentage
marketed through each exporter.
Exporter X %
A BETKO
B CAPE FIVE EXPORT SA (PTY) LTD
C CAPESPAN
D COLORS FRUIT (SA) (PTY) LTD
E DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE (pTY) LTD
F DOLE SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
G DU TOIT VRUGTE
H FEDFA EXPORTERS (PTY) LTD
I TRU-CAPE (PTY) LTD
J LONA TRADING (pTY) LTD
K SAFE (PTY) LTD
L SOVEREIGN FRUITS
M Other: Please name:
N Other: Please name:
0 Other: Please name:
P Other: Please name:
Q Other: Please name:
100
3. How would you describe the level of cooperation between you and your exporter in the
following business activities? (please mark the appropriate block).







4. Have you been involved in any joint development projects (such as increasing storage
capacity, or staff training) with this exporter within the last 12 months?
(Yes/No)_. If Yes, describe: _
5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding your
relationship with your exporter.
85
Statement Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
A~ree A2ree Disa2ree Disa2ree
A We devote considerable time trying to improve
this relationship
B We devote considerable time trying to improve
the exporter's efficiency
C We have made a substantial number of
adaptations in our delivery schedule in order to
deal more effectively with this exporter
D We often discuss issues such as changes in
technology and market conditions
E We have extensive formal and informal
communications
F We discuss only need-to-know information that
relates directly to our relationship
G We make joint decisions about:




I We have a strong personal confidence in each
other
J We have a strong business confidence in each
other
K We can always rely on each other when it
counts
L I believe this exporter will work hard in the
future to maintain a close relationship with my
firm
M I am very confident that this relationship will
continue in the future
SECTION D: PRODUCER - PACKER QUESTIONS
1. When did your finn begin its apple packaging operation? (MonthlYear) I__~
2. What was the main reason for deciding to pack your own apples? _
3. What is the maximum apple packaging capacity of the packhouse? tons.
4. How did last year's crop pack out according to the following classes?
Class offruit Percentage of
Crop (%)
A Export
B Class I: Local
C Class IT: Local
D Processed
E Other: Please SpecifY:
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THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY.
All questionnaires will be handled in the strictest confidence and no individual producer will





Telephone: ('- ), --eFax: ('-__~), _
